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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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초록· 키워드
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1. Purpose of the Research
Several studies show that among different types of corruption in Korea, the most serious one is related to corruption by politicians. In Park's research (1999), 96% of respondents believe that politicians are most corrupt. Jang (2000) reveals that politicians are more likely to receive bribes than any other occupations.
Nevertheless, political corruption studies have mainly focused on research by asking questionnaire respondents indirectly about "how much do you think politicians are corrupt?" The results of this type of research do not present political corruption itself, but third party's perception on political corruption.
On the other hand, the previous research on political corruption has paid a little attention on both axes of political corruption - that is, politician and businessmen. In general, every social behaviors have their actors and reactors in order to become social and both actors and reactors should be analyzed to understand those behaviors. By the same token, studies on political corruption in collusion with business have to analyze both politicians and businessmen in order to understand political corruption.
The main purpose of this study is to find out empirical, neither speculated nor theoretical, data on political corruption in collusion with business and, therefore, provide a bunch of evidences through which we can see political corruption as it is. In the analysis of the relationship between politicians and businessmen, this research shows networks of political corruption in collusion with business, socio-cultural background of Korean political corruption explaining one of the major causes of corruption, and punishment (types of crime judges sentenced, length of sentences, probation, amnesty rate, fines, the rate of 'not-guilty' and so on).
2. Sampling selection and procedure
For this research, data had been collected through major daily newspapers, court archives, and prosecution office's documents from January to October, 2001. Besides these, data were also collected from the Parliament, the Supreme Prosecution's Office, governmental offices, and private publication. Finally, total 111 political corruption cases and 597 people related to the corruption were collected and analyzed.
There are two axes of actors to be analyzed - that is, politicians and businessmen, Politicians include Presidents and their relatives, officials in the presidential office, parliament men, ministers, high ranking officials next to the ministers. Presidents' relatives, as well as high-ranking officials, have played significant roles enough to change policies and had powers equivalent to politicians. Businessmen include owners of conglomerates, CEOs, middle-size business owners and so on.
3. Cultural Context of Political Corruption in Collusion with Business
The cultural tradition emphasizing family relationship is deeply associated with political corruption in Korea. According to Chang(1992), "individuals can not be independent from their family and the whole family itself has been more emphasized than individual members of the family. This relationship extends its realm to the society and control the way of life, social relationships, and value system in the society as whole." This relation becomes one of the most significant causes of corruption in Korea (Chang, 1992).
Lee(2000) remarks that family itself is more important than any other social groups; family relationship is not based on equality but hierarchy; and the relationship in the society which is originated from the family relationship affects organization structure of the society, even daily life of the members.
The family relationship characterized by collectivity facilitates new forms of collective consciousness and behavior through consanguinity, regionalism, and school-ties. Family meetings through consanguinity, hometown-based meetings, alumni association show new forms of values, norms, behavior patterns through which members of these new organizations are connected to political corruption.
One of the behavior patterns related to corruption is "gift-giving culture." As a matter of fact, this culture has been one way of maintaining of group coherence and helping each other. For example, in the wedding ceremony, guests offers a 'good-will envelop,' usually containing cash, to hosts/hostesses whom use it as their living expenses. However, this 'gift-giving' culture is also use as a way of bribery by corrupt politicians and businessmen.
4. Current situation of corruption among the public officials
During the last two decades, the number of corrupt officials has been up and down. However, the number of corrupt officials shows rapid increases in the years that new regimes come out. To justify legitimacy of their regimes, enforce the political stability, and control the government officials, the Roh Tae-woo's regime and Kim Young-sam's regime had investigated and punished corrupt officials at the beginning year of their regimes. We call this "seasonal effect" of strengthening political power.
From 1980 to 1999, total number of 95 high-ranking officials of 1st grade, equivalent to assistance to vice minister, and ministers had been punished by the laws of corruption, abuse of power, and negligence of duty. The number of those officials punished by negligence of duty amounted to 54% of the total number of officials punished. One third of the total number was related to bribery. During the period from 1980 to 1999, 3.8 officials were punished every year in average.
5. Findings
Out of 597 corrupt people in 111 cases, 40 people (6.7%) were Presidents, their relatives, and those working in the Presidential residence. One-hundred and thirty four people (22.4%) of them were politicians and staff of political parties. The number of high-ranking officials involved in the political corruption amounted to 68 people (11.4%). Businessmen who involved in the corruption were 273 (45.7%).
Each case of the political corruption in collusion with business involved 5.4 people in average. During the period of last three regimes, the Kim Young-sam's regime had the highest number of businessmen involved in the political corruption. However, when the ratios of businessmen to each politician were compared, the highest ratio was presented in the Fifth Republic led by Chun Doo-hwan while the Kim' regime showed lowest - 10.4 and 0.9, respectively. This figure presents that many businessmen approached to politicians in order to achieve their goals during the Fifth Republic while politicians were more likely to respond to businessmen in order to receive monetary feedback to their efforts. In fact, President Chun had exerted his strong political power all over the society while President Kim had conceded the great amount of power to his fellow politicians.
In short, presidents, their relatives, and presidential staff had involved most frequently in the political corruption during the Chun's regime, whereas politicians and businessmen had involved most frequently in the corruption during the Kim's regime and high-ranking officials during the Roh's regime.
In the analysis of corruption in terms of types of violation, bribery was the most frequently committed crime in the political corruption. Over one half of the total violation is related to bribery. The next frequent ones were embezzlement and violation of political fund in order. In fact, those violations were all related to bribes. Thus, two out of three cases involved in the political violation were related to bribery.
Each bribe-takers received 437 million Won (approximately US$437,000) in average. This amount kept raising before the beginning of the Kim's regime. The average amount of embezzlement, which businessmen had provided for the slush fund of the business and, in turn, the fund became bribes, reached 1.26 billion Won (approximately, US$1.26 million).
In the punishment for the corrupt, four out ten were sentenced for three years and one month in prison in average. Corrupt people under the Chun's regime were most seriously punished in terms of prison sentence. They got three year and eight months of prison sentence in average.
Average fine per a corrupt person was 838 million Won (US$838,000). The highest fine was imposed on those under the Chun's regime. Confiscation per each corrupt person was 7.185 billion Won (US$7.185 million).
Forty-one percents of the corrupt received amnesty and 38.4% were restored to their rights. The most frequent possibility of receiving amnesty was occurred during the Kim's regime.
Among those who were sentenced not guilty, the most frequently receiving penalty was related to bribery. The court could not prove that those corrupt people received bribes as a kickback by using their power and position.
The most frequent end to be corrupt was connected to business permits and pressure for weak supervision on their works. The next frequent one was related to business contracts with the central or local governments.
Political corruption in Korea has been led by businessmen. Two out of three corruption cases were initiated by businessmen. Politicians and high-ranking officials were usually asked to favor for businessmen. There were a few cases that politicians and officials initiatively led corruption.
In terms of corruption networks, the most frequently occurring type was the one that corruption initiator, the involved, and targets were in a direct line in a continuum. Over 20% of the cases were included in this type. The second most frequent one is the type that several initiators (businessmen) in a single case had one target (politician or government official). The third one was the type that one initiator has several targets.
6. Anti-corruption policies and conclusion
There are three kinds of anti-corruption policy; legislation and revision of laws and regulations, establishment of specific anti-corruption organizations, and anti-corruption activities. During the period analyzed, eight laws preventing corruption were legislated or revised. Under the Kim's regime, five laws were legislated and during the Roh's regime, there was no laws legislated.
In regard to the establishment of specific anti-corruption organizations, ten organizations were established to prevent corruption. They were included in Presidential special commissions, under the Prime Minister's Office, or under the Supreme Prosecutor's Office. The Roh's regime established four organizations while the Chun's and the Kim's regime established three and two, respectively.
In relation to anti-corruption activities, the Roh's regime conducted 13 activities, while the Kim's and the Chun's regime conducted six and five activities, respectively. In a glance when we looked at two types of anti-corruption policies, the Kim's and Roh's regime were more likely to be exert to their efforts to eradicate corruption than the Chun's. However, there were 33 and 45 political corruption cases occurred under the Roh's and Kim's regime, respectively, while there were 27 cases occurred under the Chun's regime. In other words, the intensity of government efforts is not effective to reduce political corruption. Rather, there seems to be another factor most effective to reduce corruption in Korea.
In political corruption in collusion with business in Korea, two out of three cases were related to bribery; therefore, if anti-corruption policies consider bribery, there will be an effective one to control corruption in Korea. The precise definition of bribe is strongly associated with the prevention of corruption. The conditions defining bribes and its ambiguity in the judicial precedents may render corruptors chances of corrupt behavior. Unless prosecutors do prove money that corruptor receives as bribes, those who take bribes become innocent. In fact, the court's decision on corruption is very limited; thus, unless prosecutors prove it by considering the abuse of power, the relationship between giver and taker of bribes, and even their personal relationship which may cause corruption, they will be innocent.
Some offices in the central government are now using their own standard of preventing bribery. The limit that governmental officials can receive would be 100,000 Won (US$80-90).
Along with the ambiguity of defining bribe, the punishment for the corrupt should be intensified. According to the current punishment, the prison terms for the corrupt is a little higher than those for street crimes. Under this circumstance, politician and officials may risk their status if they make a lot money. In other words, if the corrupt receive rewards more than punishment, they would be more likely to act than otherwise. Thus, to reduce political corruption, the punishment should be reinforced.
Several studies show that among different types of corruption in Korea, the most serious one is related to corruption by politicians. In Park's research (1999), 96% of respondents believe that politicians are most corrupt. Jang (2000) reveals that politicians are more likely to receive bribes than any other occupations.
Nevertheless, political corruption studies have mainly focused on research by asking questionnaire respondents indirectly about "how much do you think politicians are corrupt?" The results of this type of research do not present political corruption itself, but third party's perception on political corruption.
On the other hand, the previous research on political corruption has paid a little attention on both axes of political corruption - that is, politician and businessmen. In general, every social behaviors have their actors and reactors in order to become social and both actors and reactors should be analyzed to understand those behaviors. By the same token, studies on political corruption in collusion with business have to analyze both politicians and businessmen in order to understand political corruption.
The main purpose of this study is to find out empirical, neither speculated nor theoretical, data on political corruption in collusion with business and, therefore, provide a bunch of evidences through which we can see political corruption as it is. In the analysis of the relationship between politicians and businessmen, this research shows networks of political corruption in collusion with business, socio-cultural background of Korean political corruption explaining one of the major causes of corruption, and punishment (types of crime judges sentenced, length of sentences, probation, amnesty rate, fines, the rate of 'not-guilty' and so on).
2. Sampling selection and procedure
For this research, data had been collected through major daily newspapers, court archives, and prosecution office's documents from January to October, 2001. Besides these, data were also collected from the Parliament, the Supreme Prosecution's Office, governmental offices, and private publication. Finally, total 111 political corruption cases and 597 people related to the corruption were collected and analyzed.
There are two axes of actors to be analyzed - that is, politicians and businessmen, Politicians include Presidents and their relatives, officials in the presidential office, parliament men, ministers, high ranking officials next to the ministers. Presidents' relatives, as well as high-ranking officials, have played significant roles enough to change policies and had powers equivalent to politicians. Businessmen include owners of conglomerates, CEOs, middle-size business owners and so on.
3. Cultural Context of Political Corruption in Collusion with Business
The cultural tradition emphasizing family relationship is deeply associated with political corruption in Korea. According to Chang(1992), "individuals can not be independent from their family and the whole family itself has been more emphasized than individual members of the family. This relationship extends its realm to the society and control the way of life, social relationships, and value system in the society as whole." This relation becomes one of the most significant causes of corruption in Korea (Chang, 1992).
Lee(2000) remarks that family itself is more important than any other social groups; family relationship is not based on equality but hierarchy; and the relationship in the society which is originated from the family relationship affects organization structure of the society, even daily life of the members.
The family relationship characterized by collectivity facilitates new forms of collective consciousness and behavior through consanguinity, regionalism, and school-ties. Family meetings through consanguinity, hometown-based meetings, alumni association show new forms of values, norms, behavior patterns through which members of these new organizations are connected to political corruption.
One of the behavior patterns related to corruption is "gift-giving culture." As a matter of fact, this culture has been one way of maintaining of group coherence and helping each other. For example, in the wedding ceremony, guests offers a 'good-will envelop,' usually containing cash, to hosts/hostesses whom use it as their living expenses. However, this 'gift-giving' culture is also use as a way of bribery by corrupt politicians and businessmen.
4. Current situation of corruption among the public officials
During the last two decades, the number of corrupt officials has been up and down. However, the number of corrupt officials shows rapid increases in the years that new regimes come out. To justify legitimacy of their regimes, enforce the political stability, and control the government officials, the Roh Tae-woo's regime and Kim Young-sam's regime had investigated and punished corrupt officials at the beginning year of their regimes. We call this "seasonal effect" of strengthening political power.
From 1980 to 1999, total number of 95 high-ranking officials of 1st grade, equivalent to assistance to vice minister, and ministers had been punished by the laws of corruption, abuse of power, and negligence of duty. The number of those officials punished by negligence of duty amounted to 54% of the total number of officials punished. One third of the total number was related to bribery. During the period from 1980 to 1999, 3.8 officials were punished every year in average.
5. Findings
Out of 597 corrupt people in 111 cases, 40 people (6.7%) were Presidents, their relatives, and those working in the Presidential residence. One-hundred and thirty four people (22.4%) of them were politicians and staff of political parties. The number of high-ranking officials involved in the political corruption amounted to 68 people (11.4%). Businessmen who involved in the corruption were 273 (45.7%).
Each case of the political corruption in collusion with business involved 5.4 people in average. During the period of last three regimes, the Kim Young-sam's regime had the highest number of businessmen involved in the political corruption. However, when the ratios of businessmen to each politician were compared, the highest ratio was presented in the Fifth Republic led by Chun Doo-hwan while the Kim' regime showed lowest - 10.4 and 0.9, respectively. This figure presents that many businessmen approached to politicians in order to achieve their goals during the Fifth Republic while politicians were more likely to respond to businessmen in order to receive monetary feedback to their efforts. In fact, President Chun had exerted his strong political power all over the society while President Kim had conceded the great amount of power to his fellow politicians.
In short, presidents, their relatives, and presidential staff had involved most frequently in the political corruption during the Chun's regime, whereas politicians and businessmen had involved most frequently in the corruption during the Kim's regime and high-ranking officials during the Roh's regime.
In the analysis of corruption in terms of types of violation, bribery was the most frequently committed crime in the political corruption. Over one half of the total violation is related to bribery. The next frequent ones were embezzlement and violation of political fund in order. In fact, those violations were all related to bribes. Thus, two out of three cases involved in the political violation were related to bribery.
Each bribe-takers received 437 million Won (approximately US$437,000) in average. This amount kept raising before the beginning of the Kim's regime. The average amount of embezzlement, which businessmen had provided for the slush fund of the business and, in turn, the fund became bribes, reached 1.26 billion Won (approximately, US$1.26 million).
In the punishment for the corrupt, four out ten were sentenced for three years and one month in prison in average. Corrupt people under the Chun's regime were most seriously punished in terms of prison sentence. They got three year and eight months of prison sentence in average.
Average fine per a corrupt person was 838 million Won (US$838,000). The highest fine was imposed on those under the Chun's regime. Confiscation per each corrupt person was 7.185 billion Won (US$7.185 million).
Forty-one percents of the corrupt received amnesty and 38.4% were restored to their rights. The most frequent possibility of receiving amnesty was occurred during the Kim's regime.
Among those who were sentenced not guilty, the most frequently receiving penalty was related to bribery. The court could not prove that those corrupt people received bribes as a kickback by using their power and position.
The most frequent end to be corrupt was connected to business permits and pressure for weak supervision on their works. The next frequent one was related to business contracts with the central or local governments.
Political corruption in Korea has been led by businessmen. Two out of three corruption cases were initiated by businessmen. Politicians and high-ranking officials were usually asked to favor for businessmen. There were a few cases that politicians and officials initiatively led corruption.
In terms of corruption networks, the most frequently occurring type was the one that corruption initiator, the involved, and targets were in a direct line in a continuum. Over 20% of the cases were included in this type. The second most frequent one is the type that several initiators (businessmen) in a single case had one target (politician or government official). The third one was the type that one initiator has several targets.
6. Anti-corruption policies and conclusion
There are three kinds of anti-corruption policy; legislation and revision of laws and regulations, establishment of specific anti-corruption organizations, and anti-corruption activities. During the period analyzed, eight laws preventing corruption were legislated or revised. Under the Kim's regime, five laws were legislated and during the Roh's regime, there was no laws legislated.
In regard to the establishment of specific anti-corruption organizations, ten organizations were established to prevent corruption. They were included in Presidential special commissions, under the Prime Minister's Office, or under the Supreme Prosecutor's Office. The Roh's regime established four organizations while the Chun's and the Kim's regime established three and two, respectively.
In relation to anti-corruption activities, the Roh's regime conducted 13 activities, while the Kim's and the Chun's regime conducted six and five activities, respectively. In a glance when we looked at two types of anti-corruption policies, the Kim's and Roh's regime were more likely to be exert to their efforts to eradicate corruption than the Chun's. However, there were 33 and 45 political corruption cases occurred under the Roh's and Kim's regime, respectively, while there were 27 cases occurred under the Chun's regime. In other words, the intensity of government efforts is not effective to reduce political corruption. Rather, there seems to be another factor most effective to reduce corruption in Korea.
In political corruption in collusion with business in Korea, two out of three cases were related to bribery; therefore, if anti-corruption policies consider bribery, there will be an effective one to control corruption in Korea. The precise definition of bribe is strongly associated with the prevention of corruption. The conditions defining bribes and its ambiguity in the judicial precedents may render corruptors chances of corrupt behavior. Unless prosecutors do prove money that corruptor receives as bribes, those who take bribes become innocent. In fact, the court's decision on corruption is very limited; thus, unless prosecutors prove it by considering the abuse of power, the relationship between giver and taker of bribes, and even their personal relationship which may cause corruption, they will be innocent.
Some offices in the central government are now using their own standard of preventing bribery. The limit that governmental officials can receive would be 100,000 Won (US$80-90).
Along with the ambiguity of defining bribe, the punishment for the corrupt should be intensified. According to the current punishment, the prison terms for the corrupt is a little higher than those for street crimes. Under this circumstance, politician and officials may risk their status if they make a lot money. In other words, if the corrupt receive rewards more than punishment, they would be more likely to act than otherwise. Thus, to reduce political corruption, the punishment should be reinforced.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 연구방법
Ⅲ. 정경유착 부패의 유형 및 정의
Ⅵ. 정경유착 부패의 사회문화적/역사적 맥락
Ⅴ. 정경유착 부패의 실태
Ⅵ. 반부패 정책과 부패 개선방안
Ⅶ. 결론
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대법원 2000. 1. 21. 선고 99도4940 판결
[1] 임의성 없는 자백의 증거능력을 부정하는 취지는 허위진술을 유발 또는 강요할 위험성이 있는 상태하에서 행하여진 자백은 그 자체가 실체적 진실에 부합하지 아니할 소지가 있으므로 그 증거능력을 부정함으로써 오판의 소지를 없애려고 하는 데에 있을 뿐만 아니라, 그 진위 여부를 떠나서 임의성 없는 자백의 증거능력을 부정함으로써 자백을 얻기
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