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자료유형
학술저널
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한국라틴아메리카학회 라틴아메리카연구 라틴아메리카연구 Vol.15 No.2
발행연도
2002.12
수록면
101 - 148 (48page)

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This paper investigates conditions under which a debtor country can draw out a favorable outcome in a external debt rescheduling negotiation focusing on the experiences of Brazil since the late 1980s. Brazil was unique in that it successfully negotiated for a Brady Plan agreement with its creditors without first signing an adjustment plan with the IMF. Normally, an agreement with the IMF is a sine qua non for debt rescheduling.
Unlike the game-theoretic, actor-oriented existing literature that explains the negotiated outcome in terms of the strategic choice, this paper argues that it was the relative issue-related and generic resources of the parties that largely shapes the outcome. In the Brazilian case, the big difference between the late 1980s and the early 1990s was that in the latter period it had relatively ample debt-related resources such as foreign exchange reserves and favorable macroeconomic conditions. Such resources enabled Brazil, among others, to hoard US Treasury bonds which could be used to guarantee the Brady bonds even without further financing from the IMF.
This paper also challenges the conventional wisdom that the more united internally, the more bargaining leverage a country has externally. For Brazil, the fragile domestic coalitional stability worked in its favor, gaining concessions from the creditors. This finding confirms earlier insights provided by Thomas Schelling's tying hands strategy and Putnam's two-level game metaphor.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 외채협상의 일반적 틀
Ⅲ. 브라질의 외채 협상
Ⅳ. 결론과 시사점
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