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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국무역학회 무역학회지 貿易學會誌 第28卷 第2號
발행연도
2003.4
수록면
55 - 79 (25page)

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The FTA negotiation between Korea and Chile, which began in 1999, had dragged on for three years before recently being concluded. The biggest factor that had contributed to the delay lay not in difficulties of international negotiation between the Korean government and Chilean government but in the vehement opposition from domestic interest groups.
Given the situation, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the political reaction of various domestic constituents in the process of Korea- Chile FTA negotiation using the theoretical framework of Putnam's Two-Level Game. This paper shows that, in such FTA policy which clearly divides constituents into 'losers' and 'winners', Korean government is experiencing greater difficulties in controlling the fierce political reaction of loser-industries such as the farmers' associations than in negotiating with Chilean government. Overall our study shows that Asymmetrical reaction among 'politically-loud voice loser' and 'silent winner', politicalization of the FTA issues, and political intervention, with lack of Korean president's political leadership are making Korea's internal negotiation process considerably difficult. Policy implications of this study regarding the Korea's further FTA negotiation strategies with China and Japan are discussed.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 이론적 분석틀
Ⅲ. 한ㆍ칠레 FTA 협상사례를 통한 분석
Ⅳ. 결론
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