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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2002.3
- 수록면
- 85 - 110 (26page)
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초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
The tragedy on September 11, 2001 was a wake-up call for Americans. After September 11, more people are now supportive for President Gorge W. Bush's handling of the war on terrorism and 88 percent of the people approve of his performance in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Bush's extraordinary level of popularity-higher and more protracted than any modern president-is all the more noteworthy because it comes at a time when the American public has significant doubts about the economy and other domestic matters.
In outlining the direction of the task ahead in the war against terrorism, President Bush told Congress in his State Union Address on January 29, 2002 that North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, accused by the administration of trying to develop biological, chemical and nuclear weapons form an "axis of evil" and that time was running out for the United States to counter the danger. By singling out North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, Bush elevated concerns about weapons of mass destruction to the same level of terrorism. Yet, his strong and clear signal to do everything in his power to prevent those regimes to threaten the U.S. causes concerns on the possibility of war on the peninsula and brings angry reaction from the progressive sector of the Korean society.
President Kim Dae-jung, who has been a pioneer of sunshine policy to rescue North Korea to coming out of isolation, does not wish to acknowledge in public that his policy has come to an end. President Bush's strong stance against North Korea is hurting Kim Dae-jung's image as a peace maker and perhaps the most prominent achievement, if not the only one, he made himself during his 5-year tenure by visiting Pyongyang for breaking historic North-South Summit meeting in June 15, 2001. Bush's stern warning, therefore, aggravated further the President Kim's losing popularity and it will definitely harm his party's prospects for the midterm elections in June and Presidential election, which are less than 10 months away.
During his visit to Seoul, President Bush made it clear that the United States supports President Kim's sunshine policy and will be ready to talk with North Korea. Yet, he did not make no mistake to reiterate that North Korea should change its behaviour first by giving up its weapons of mass destruction and allowing verification measures. President Bush also emphasizes that Pyongyang has to move back its forward deployment forces and artilleries along the line of DMZ.
Seoul should recognize the difference between the Clinton Administration and Bush Administration in modalities and implementation of the engagement policy toward North Korea. Moreover, it is imperative for Seoul to keep in mind that future dialogue with North Korea including arms control discussions, be made on the basis of the shared strategic vision between the ROK and the United States. As Condoleezza Rice correctly points out that peace on the Korean peninsula has been and will be maintained not by North Korea's goodwill but by the U.S.-ROK security cooperation. We have to realize that President Bush's strong warning to Pyongyang in his recent visit to Seoul was not the embarrassment to the Korean people but the golden opportunity for pressuring Kim Jong-Il to change his course of action.
In outlining the direction of the task ahead in the war against terrorism, President Bush told Congress in his State Union Address on January 29, 2002 that North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, accused by the administration of trying to develop biological, chemical and nuclear weapons form an "axis of evil" and that time was running out for the United States to counter the danger. By singling out North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, Bush elevated concerns about weapons of mass destruction to the same level of terrorism. Yet, his strong and clear signal to do everything in his power to prevent those regimes to threaten the U.S. causes concerns on the possibility of war on the peninsula and brings angry reaction from the progressive sector of the Korean society.
President Kim Dae-jung, who has been a pioneer of sunshine policy to rescue North Korea to coming out of isolation, does not wish to acknowledge in public that his policy has come to an end. President Bush's strong stance against North Korea is hurting Kim Dae-jung's image as a peace maker and perhaps the most prominent achievement, if not the only one, he made himself during his 5-year tenure by visiting Pyongyang for breaking historic North-South Summit meeting in June 15, 2001. Bush's stern warning, therefore, aggravated further the President Kim's losing popularity and it will definitely harm his party's prospects for the midterm elections in June and Presidential election, which are less than 10 months away.
During his visit to Seoul, President Bush made it clear that the United States supports President Kim's sunshine policy and will be ready to talk with North Korea. Yet, he did not make no mistake to reiterate that North Korea should change its behaviour first by giving up its weapons of mass destruction and allowing verification measures. President Bush also emphasizes that Pyongyang has to move back its forward deployment forces and artilleries along the line of DMZ.
Seoul should recognize the difference between the Clinton Administration and Bush Administration in modalities and implementation of the engagement policy toward North Korea. Moreover, it is imperative for Seoul to keep in mind that future dialogue with North Korea including arms control discussions, be made on the basis of the shared strategic vision between the ROK and the United States. As Condoleezza Rice correctly points out that peace on the Korean peninsula has been and will be maintained not by North Korea's goodwill but by the U.S.-ROK security cooperation. We have to realize that President Bush's strong warning to Pyongyang in his recent visit to Seoul was not the embarrassment to the Korean people but the golden opportunity for pressuring Kim Jong-Il to change his course of action.
목차
1. 서론
2. 부시 행정부의 등장과 한미공조의 한계
3. 한미동맹 간의 인식차이 : 배경과 심화과정
4. 부시의 “악의 축” 발언과 한미동맹의 조율
5. 결론
[ABSTRACT]
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