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논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2002.3
- 수록면
- 65 - 84 (20page)
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It is commonly mentioned that everything has changed since the events of September 11, 2001. Evidently some things have changed; others have been reinforced; and others have become visible though previously had went unrecognized. America's war against terrorism will certainly have an impact on many states. North Korea has been one of the states on the list of terrorist states. Then we must raise the question, "Will the DPRK survive, say, by the year 2020?"
The Kim's regime could be, like any other state's political regime, threatened to be overthrown, in theory, from "within" as well as from "without." Firstly, let me examine the possibility for Kim's regime to be overthrown from within. Until now, there has been no known factor for us to speculate that there any noteworthy political opposition to Kim's regime within North Korea's borders. There has never been any report that may indicate even a symptom of rebellion against the leadership of the two Kims (i.e. Kim I1 Sung and Kim Jong Il). In midst of the serious situation of nationwide starvation, there were many North Koreans who wanted to escape from North Korea at the risk of their lives. However, there were no people who dared to challenge Kim's leadership. Since he became the heir of Kim Il Sung in February 1974, Kim Jong n consolidated his personal power basis throughout North Korea's governmental organizations and virtually ruled North Korea for the last almost three decades. Kim is a great pretender. Holding up the picket saying "Our way to Socialism" high, he pretends to be an infallible Philosopher-King who has perfect knowledge of the changing outside world and how to cope with it. But he is nothing but a violent tyrant. We know that the tyrant Stalin was not overthrown from within while he was alive, however terrible the tyrant might have been, not to mention Hitler(Unser Fuhrer), Mussolini(Il Duce) and Hirohito(Tenno Heika). Like his historical predecessors, "Supreme Leader Kim"(Dear Soo Ryong) in North Korea is not likely to be overthrown from within.
Secondly, then, is there any possibility for Kim's regime to be overthrown from the outside? If Kim Jong Il is content in maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, it could be safely said that no outside powers including the United States have intentions to overthrow the Kim's regime in North Korea. Besides, China is an ally of a kind in that it would not let North Korea be unified by South Korea, as made clear by the massive military intervention during the Korean War to maintain North Korea as a separate political entity, most friendly to or at least not hostile to China. However Kim Jong Il continues to pursue a positive goal, an ambitious, revolutionary, revisionist, self-imposed historical mission to unify the whole Korean peninsula on his own terms by his own strategy, as his father Kim Il Sung did throughout his life time, though without success. In other words, Kim continues a revolutionary war against South Korea. For Kim, war is merely a continuation of politics by other means. Such a strategic mindset was handed down from Clausewitz to Lenin to Stalin and Mao to Kim 11 Sung and finally to Kim Jong I1. Yet Kim Jong I1 has also a distorted form of the Clausewitzean dictum. For Kim Jong I1, a hereditary prince, as for Machiavelli, "the arts of peace are those of non-violent war by fraud." For Kim, peace also is a mere continuation of war by other means. Kim Jong I1 employed the strategy of mendicant brinkmanship to outside powers. They could not ignore Kim. North Korea's internal disaster will explode over Northeast Asia. To prevent that, the U.S. must sustain the repugnant regime. Food and energy donations propped up the most repressive government in the world, because North Korea's missiles with nuclear, biological or chemical bombs can reach South Korea and Japan, two key U.S. allies. Kim's mendicant brinkmanship has been successful until now.
U.S. strategy since the Cold War has focused on conventional regional war. The geographic scale of this war can be specified since it comes from the Korean peninsula. Within it, the U.S., together of course with South Korea, has prepared for conventional warfare in which nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and ballistic missiles are not to be used. This plays to American strengths. No nation could stand up to the United States in such a war. But North Korea has been trying to overcome the U.S. psychological and military advantages. North Korea has been diversifying into nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In Clausewitz's terminology, biological weapons move the center of gravity of the war from the front, where the U.S. has advantage, to the rear, the population centers, where the U.S. clearly does not. Germ weapons target innocent lives, not military force. It would be suicidal for North Korea to launch such an attack, but the possibility it might do so makes Washington thread more carefully, especially after the tragic incident of September 11, 2001. North Korea's hitting Seoul or Tokyo or both cities with anthrax bombs will be horrible. Therefore, North Korea may be treated more gingerly.
There is no doubt that the inter-Korea summit meeting was an historic event. It is a timely intriguing question whether the inter-Korea summit meeting will be a historical turning point for Korea's national history or turn out to be nothing but deceptive pageantry carefully choreographed by Kim Jong Il. By now, most indications in the post-summit period suggest that hopes were raised too high and too prematurely. One thing is still clear; Kim Jong Il has no intention to change his exclusive policy, not to mention not giving in to external pressure to compromise. Kim Jong Il will continue to behave like a hedgehog toward the outside world, holding up the anachronistic icon of "Juche" high. As Aristophanes said, "You can not teach a crab to walk straight." Despite Hamish McRae's optimistic prediction that it is very hard for him to see anything other than unification of North and South by 2020, South Korea's sunshine will not be able to lighten Kim's kingdom of darkness as long as Kim Jong Il is alive, even by the year 2020. The inter-Korean relationship is ruled by a kind of unit-veto system, Like the weather, we can always talk about it, but no one can do anything about Kim's totalitarian regime in North Korea especially as long as China supports it.
In short, my crystal ball is not clear, but at least I can say that the DPRK will not be overthrown from the outside, either. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, it would be better for us to remind ourselves of what English poet William Blake sang at the dawn of the nineteenth century:
"You throw the sand against the wind, And the wind blows it back again."
The Kim's regime could be, like any other state's political regime, threatened to be overthrown, in theory, from "within" as well as from "without." Firstly, let me examine the possibility for Kim's regime to be overthrown from within. Until now, there has been no known factor for us to speculate that there any noteworthy political opposition to Kim's regime within North Korea's borders. There has never been any report that may indicate even a symptom of rebellion against the leadership of the two Kims (i.e. Kim I1 Sung and Kim Jong Il). In midst of the serious situation of nationwide starvation, there were many North Koreans who wanted to escape from North Korea at the risk of their lives. However, there were no people who dared to challenge Kim's leadership. Since he became the heir of Kim Il Sung in February 1974, Kim Jong n consolidated his personal power basis throughout North Korea's governmental organizations and virtually ruled North Korea for the last almost three decades. Kim is a great pretender. Holding up the picket saying "Our way to Socialism" high, he pretends to be an infallible Philosopher-King who has perfect knowledge of the changing outside world and how to cope with it. But he is nothing but a violent tyrant. We know that the tyrant Stalin was not overthrown from within while he was alive, however terrible the tyrant might have been, not to mention Hitler(Unser Fuhrer), Mussolini(Il Duce) and Hirohito(Tenno Heika). Like his historical predecessors, "Supreme Leader Kim"(Dear Soo Ryong) in North Korea is not likely to be overthrown from within.
Secondly, then, is there any possibility for Kim's regime to be overthrown from the outside? If Kim Jong Il is content in maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, it could be safely said that no outside powers including the United States have intentions to overthrow the Kim's regime in North Korea. Besides, China is an ally of a kind in that it would not let North Korea be unified by South Korea, as made clear by the massive military intervention during the Korean War to maintain North Korea as a separate political entity, most friendly to or at least not hostile to China. However Kim Jong Il continues to pursue a positive goal, an ambitious, revolutionary, revisionist, self-imposed historical mission to unify the whole Korean peninsula on his own terms by his own strategy, as his father Kim Il Sung did throughout his life time, though without success. In other words, Kim continues a revolutionary war against South Korea. For Kim, war is merely a continuation of politics by other means. Such a strategic mindset was handed down from Clausewitz to Lenin to Stalin and Mao to Kim 11 Sung and finally to Kim Jong I1. Yet Kim Jong I1 has also a distorted form of the Clausewitzean dictum. For Kim Jong I1, a hereditary prince, as for Machiavelli, "the arts of peace are those of non-violent war by fraud." For Kim, peace also is a mere continuation of war by other means. Kim Jong I1 employed the strategy of mendicant brinkmanship to outside powers. They could not ignore Kim. North Korea's internal disaster will explode over Northeast Asia. To prevent that, the U.S. must sustain the repugnant regime. Food and energy donations propped up the most repressive government in the world, because North Korea's missiles with nuclear, biological or chemical bombs can reach South Korea and Japan, two key U.S. allies. Kim's mendicant brinkmanship has been successful until now.
U.S. strategy since the Cold War has focused on conventional regional war. The geographic scale of this war can be specified since it comes from the Korean peninsula. Within it, the U.S., together of course with South Korea, has prepared for conventional warfare in which nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and ballistic missiles are not to be used. This plays to American strengths. No nation could stand up to the United States in such a war. But North Korea has been trying to overcome the U.S. psychological and military advantages. North Korea has been diversifying into nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In Clausewitz's terminology, biological weapons move the center of gravity of the war from the front, where the U.S. has advantage, to the rear, the population centers, where the U.S. clearly does not. Germ weapons target innocent lives, not military force. It would be suicidal for North Korea to launch such an attack, but the possibility it might do so makes Washington thread more carefully, especially after the tragic incident of September 11, 2001. North Korea's hitting Seoul or Tokyo or both cities with anthrax bombs will be horrible. Therefore, North Korea may be treated more gingerly.
There is no doubt that the inter-Korea summit meeting was an historic event. It is a timely intriguing question whether the inter-Korea summit meeting will be a historical turning point for Korea's national history or turn out to be nothing but deceptive pageantry carefully choreographed by Kim Jong Il. By now, most indications in the post-summit period suggest that hopes were raised too high and too prematurely. One thing is still clear; Kim Jong Il has no intention to change his exclusive policy, not to mention not giving in to external pressure to compromise. Kim Jong Il will continue to behave like a hedgehog toward the outside world, holding up the anachronistic icon of "Juche" high. As Aristophanes said, "You can not teach a crab to walk straight." Despite Hamish McRae's optimistic prediction that it is very hard for him to see anything other than unification of North and South by 2020, South Korea's sunshine will not be able to lighten Kim's kingdom of darkness as long as Kim Jong Il is alive, even by the year 2020. The inter-Korean relationship is ruled by a kind of unit-veto system, Like the weather, we can always talk about it, but no one can do anything about Kim's totalitarian regime in North Korea especially as long as China supports it.
In short, my crystal ball is not clear, but at least I can say that the DPRK will not be overthrown from the outside, either. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, it would be better for us to remind ourselves of what English poet William Blake sang at the dawn of the nineteenth century:
"You throw the sand against the wind, And the wind blows it back again."
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