메뉴 건너뛰기
.. 내서재 .. 알림
소속 기관/학교 인증
인증하면 논문, 학술자료 등을  무료로 열람할 수 있어요.
한국대학교, 누리자동차, 시립도서관 등 나의 기관을 확인해보세요
(국내 대학 90% 이상 구독 중)
로그인 회원가입 고객센터 ENG
주제분류

추천
검색
질문

논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
John Ishiyama (University of North Texas, USA) Taekbin Kim (University of North Texas, USA)
저널정보
한국외국어대학교 국제지역연구센터 International Area Studies Review International Area Studies Review Vol.23 No.2
발행연도
2020.6
수록면
160 - 176 (17page)

이용수

표지
📌
연구주제
📖
연구배경
🔬
연구방법
🏆
연구결과
AI에게 요청하기
추천
검색
질문

초록· 키워드

오류제보하기
How do autocrats interact with authoritarian elites? This is a question that has gained increasing scholarly attention over the past decade. In this article, using the case of North Korea we develop a set of theoretical expectations for “elite churn” or changes in the composition of the elite (either in terms of promotions, demotions, or new entrants) resulting from moving around elites from office to office (or “elite shuffle”) and bringing in new elites. We test a number of theoretical expectations derived from the existing literature on elite management in autocracies and then examine these expectations using a panel data set of 351 members of the North Korean elite from 1948–2017. Taking into account leadership characteristics, threats to the regime (both internal and external), external opportunities, and structural factors, we find that the explanation for elite churn in North Korea is very leader specific, and is much more pronounced under Kim Jong Un than his predecessors. This suggests that Kim Jong Un’s position was much more tenuous than his father’s and grandfather’s and likely continues to be so.

목차

등록된 정보가 없습니다.

참고문헌 (0)

참고문헌 신청

이 논문의 저자 정보

이 논문과 함께 이용한 논문

최근 본 자료

전체보기

댓글(0)

0

UCI(KEPA) : I410-151-24-02-089477470