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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
조형래 (경상대학교) 이민호 (경상대학교)
저널정보
한국SCM학회 한국 SCM 학회지 한국SCM학회지 제22권 제1호
발행연도
2022.5
수록면
1 - 9 (9page)
DOI
10.25052/KSCM.2022.5.22.1.1

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초록· 키워드

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Recently, distribution companies have shown market dominance that has grown so much that they have comparative advantage in negotiating delivery prices with manufacturers in some items. Considering the ever-growing market dominance of distribution companies, the question of how manufacturers should negotiate delivery prices with distribution companies is considered one of the important decisions made by manufacturers. In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through multiple distribution companies with a difference in distribution market dominance and bargaining power with the corresponding manufacturer. To do this, we derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The result can be summarized as follows: (1) For the manufacturer, it is more advantageous to conclude delivery negotiations with both distribution companies than to sign a supply contract with a specific distributor and abandon the rest; (2) If there is a difference in control of the distribution market between distribution companies, it is disadvantageous to manufacturers, but it works in favor of distributors.; (3) Simultaneous negotiation method has always been found to be advantageous to manufacturers" profits over sequential negotiation method; (4) If the manufactrure has to negotiate sequentially, the order of negotiations has a significant impact on manufacturer’s profit.

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1. 서론
2. 분석 모형
3. 협상 균형해
4. 협상 균형해 분석
5. 결론 및 추후 연구 방향
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