지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
Ipso facto clauses may incur transaction costs due to renegotiations and, therefore, are ex post inefficient. Nevertheless, parties to a contract may have ex ante incentives to include an ipso facto clause in the contract. First, as the interests of insolvent debtors and estates are not aligned, a party can set the terms of the contract applicable when it remains solvent in its favor as compensation for allowing, when it becomes insolvent, the other party to be excused from its obligations under the contract or to obtain gains from renegotiation of the contract by invoking판례평석 the ipso facto clause. Such possibility of a party extracting private benefits at the expense of its investors engenders social inefficiency by discouraging investments for the projects the pursuit of which is socially desirable. Second, the risk of an insolvent party defaulting on its obligations under the contract that would otherwise be borne by the other party can be avoided by the ipso facto clause. Such avoidance of default risk after insolvency of a party is socially efficient in the sense that, by removing the need to offer compensation for that risk even before it is materialized, it encourages executions of contracts the performance of which is socially desirable. This conflict of competing policy goals makes it difficult to determine whether ipso facto clauses be enforceable or not.
목차
등록된 정보가 없습니다.
참고문헌 (8)
참고문헌 신청
박병대 / 1999 / 파산절차가 계약관계에 미치는 영향, In 파산법의 제문제(상) / 법원도서관
서울중앙지방법원 파산부 실무연구회 / 2006 / 법인파산실무 / 박영사
임채홍 / 2002 / 회사정리법(상)(제2판) / 한국사법행정학회
American Bar Association / 2006 / Model Joint Venture Agreement with Commentary
Che, Yeon-Koo / 1999 / Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance / J.L. Econ. & Org 15:441
서울중앙지방법원 파산부 실무연구회 / 2006 / 법인파산실무 / 박영사
임채홍 / 2002 / 회사정리법(상)(제2판) / 한국사법행정학회
American Bar Association / 2006 / Model Joint Venture Agreement with Commentary
Che, Yeon-Koo / 1999 / Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance / J.L. Econ. & Org 15:441
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