지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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While controversy over which types of trade practice should be illegal is heat in almost areas of antitrust law, We can reach one consensus that the hard-core cartels such as price-fixing, bid rigging, market allocation should be condemned. The leniency program is a means of attacking the hard-core cartels. Competition authorities may be able to destabilize more cartels if they explicitly focus on ways to create distrust among cartel members through enhancing the transparency, objectiveness, and incentives of the leniency program. Since the leniency program has improved into the Anti-monopoly and Fair trade Act in 1996, it has evolved toward those ends by a number of amendments. In order to qualify for amnesty, the current leniency program requires that the applicant corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the cartel activity and clearly was not the leader of the activity. The leader of the cartel should, however, be eligible for leniency, because there is difference between the coercion and leading in the light of the degree of condemnation and importantly, if she is not then others can trust him or her not to reveal the price-fixing to the government.
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