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The Extended Theory of Emotion as Cognition: Cognitivism Revisited
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감정에 대한 인지주의의 수정과 확장

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Type
Academic journal
Author
Journal
고려대학교 철학연구소 철학연구 철학연구 제48호 KCI Accredited Journals
Published
2013.1
Pages
197 - 224 (28page)

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The Extended Theory of Emotion as Cognition: Cognitivism Revisited
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There is strong cognitivism in the theories of emotion, which defines an emotion as a propositional belief or judgment. Strong cognitivism is untenable when it deals with emotions that exist despite beliefs or judgments inconsistent with them. In clarifying such emotions, viewing an emotion as a perception is more persuasive than viewing it as a belief or judgment (section 1). Viewing an emotion as a perception appears to indicate that the cognitivist view of emotion is beaten by the noncognitivist view, since perception has not been understood as cognition. However, in section 2, I shall argue that perception is included in the domain of cognition, and the view of an emotion as a perception is therefore included in cognitivism as well. To begin with, I will theoretically extend the term “cognition” by defending Solomon and de Sousa, and label their theory as perceptualist cognitivism. The perceptualist cognitivism interprets “cognition” as activities in which we have some kind of relation with the world. In order to bolster the argument, concrete evidence to support the extended concept of cognition will be provided in section 3. Several researches will be focused on to show as follows: (1) conceptual processing, which is one of the cognitive activities, is not totally free from perception, and (2) social cognition, like learning through imitating others’ actions, is to some extent embodied rather than purely abstract. These findings indicate that there is perceptual and embodied cognition, thus implying that cognition can be understood not only as belief and judgment, but also as perception and embodiment. In the last section (section 4), it will be discussed why this revised and extended version of cognitivism is needed. The extended theory of emotion as cognition can appropriately explain various properties of emotion, including both propositional ones and perceptual ones, without reducing all emotions to a simple thing.

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