권리능력은 권리의 주체가 될 수 있는 자격 내지 지위라고 할 수 있다. 민법 제3조가 정하고 있는 것처럼, 오늘날 모든 사람은 당연히 권리능력을 가진다. 그러나 권리능력을 가지는 존재가 사람, 즉 자연인에 한정되는 것은 아니며, 법에 의하여 인격이 부여된 존재, 즉 법인도 권리능력을 가지게 된다(민법 제34조). 이러한 권리능력은 각종 권리?의무의 귀속과 관련하여 가장 기본적인 개념이라고 할 수 있다. 그런데, 권리능력에 대해서는 그 자체보다 대개 태아나 비법인사단, 조합 등 특정한 존재의 권리능력에 관하여 연구되고 있다. 그리고 그 존재의 법적 문제 해결에 초점을 두고 연구가 이루어지다 보니, 정작 권리능력의 개념 및 핵심적인 기능 자체가 혼선을 빚는 경우들이 보이고 있다. 이에 이 글에서는 우선 권리능력의 법적 성질과 관련하여, 권리능력은 법률행위의 성립요건으로 파악하였다. 일반적인 견해는 법률행위의 효력요건으로 파악하여 권리능력이 없는 자는 권리의 주체가 될 수 없으므로 권리능력이 없는 존재가 개입된 법률행위는 무효라고 하지만, 권리능력이 없다는 것은 결국 법률주체(즉 당사자)가 존재하지 않는 것과 같은 것이기 때문이다. 다음으로 권리능력은 권리의 주체에 대해서는 권리를 향유하고 의무를 부담할 수 있도록 하는 기능을 하지만, 대외적으로는 어떠한 권리의 귀속 주체가 누구인지 명확히 하는 기능을 하므로, 권리능력이라는 개념은 절대적이고 포괄적?불가분적인 개념으로 보아야 한다는 점에 대해 서술하였다. 그리고 상대적 내지 부분적 권리능력이라는 개념을 긍정하게 되면, 권리능력을 상대적으로 이해하면서, 그 내용을 구체적·개별적으로 파악하기 때문에 권리능력의 기본적인 기능을 제대로 수행하기 어렵다는 문제점을 지적하며, 부분적 권리능력이 인정되는 존재로 거론되는 비법인사단 및 조합에 대해서도 현행법상 그 구체적인 법률관계를 분석해 보면, 부분적으로라도 권리능력이 인정된다고 보기는 어렵다는 점에 대해 살펴보았다. 그리고 이러한 내용들을 바탕으로 자연인 중 특히 태아의 권리능력에 관한 기존의 논의들을 비판하고, 법인의 권리능력이 자연인과 달리 어떻게 제한되는지에 대해 살펴보았다.
This article discussed two points more in depth compared to studies on legal capacity conducted thus far. One point is regarding whether legal capacity is a requirement for the establishment or a requirement for the effect of legal acts, and the other is regarding whether the concept of partial legal capacity can be accepted. First, with regard to whether the legal capacity is a requirement for the establishment or a requirement for the effect of legal acts, a prevalent view is understanding it as a requirement for the effect. Accordingly, a person without legal capacity cannot be a subject of rights. Therefore, a legal act involving an entity without legal capacity is said to be invalid. However, regarding the existence of legal capacity as a requirement for the effect cannot be easily accepted because the absence of legal capacity is eventually equal to the absence of legal entity (i.e. the party concerned). Therefore, legal capacity should be regarded as a requirement for the establishment of a legal act. This becomes clear when the following issue is considered. Currently, there is no disagreement, for example, on the fact that legal capacity is not recognized in animals. However, among animals, chimpanzees are said to have IQs not lower than 80, and therefore, they are said to be capable of understanding humans’ instructions to some extent. If chimpanzee A’s owner B sent chimpanzee A on a simple errand, and chimpanzee A understood the relevant instruction and followed it, should we regard that a delegation agreement has been established? If the legal capacity is regarded as requirement for the effect and the absence of legal capacity is considered as a cause of nullity, A should argue that it has no legal capacity by itself as a ground for defense against B’s argument that a delegation agreement has been established. We cannot accept this example. Eventually, legal capacity should be regarded as a requirement for the establishment of legal acts. Next, recently, most views accept the concept of partial legal capacity. However, the concrete meaning of the fact that the legal capacity of a person is recognized is that the person is enabled to make contracts, acquire rights, and bear obligations in his/her name. Since the property acquired as such becomes the property of the person of whom the legal capacity is recognized, the creditor of the person can conduct compulsory execution to his/her property. That is, the legal capacity system can be said to have an intended function to vest the property right in the person with legal capacity so that the property is independent from others’ properties, and to ensure the property as chargeable property of the creditor of the person with legal capacity. In order for legal capacity to properly perform this function, the concept of legal capacity should mean the qualification to become the subject of rights and obligations, and must be viewed as an absolute, inclusive, and indivisible concept. However, if the concept of partial legal capacity is affirmed, it is difficult to perform this functions properly, since the legal capacity is understood as being relative and the content is concretely and individually understood. In addition, when the concrete legal relations for unincorporated associations and partnerships, which are mentioned as beings for which partial legal capacity is recognized, are analyzed, it is difficult to regard that legal capacity is partially recognized. Therefore, I do not think it is necessary to acknowledge the concept of partial legal capacity. Based on the two analyses as such, this article described the legal capacity of natural persons and the legal capacity of juridical persons.