메뉴 건너뛰기
.. 내서재 .. 알림
소속 기관/학교 인증
인증하면 논문, 학술자료 등을  무료로 열람할 수 있어요.
한국대학교, 누리자동차, 시립도서관 등 나의 기관을 확인해보세요
(국내 대학 90% 이상 구독 중)
로그인 회원가입 고객센터 ENG
주제분류

추천
검색

논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국경영법률학회 경영법률 경영법률 제22권 제2호
발행연도
2012.1
수록면
1 - 34 (34page)

이용수

표지
📌
연구주제
📖
연구배경
🔬
연구방법
🏆
연구결과
AI에게 요청하기
추천
검색

초록· 키워드

오류제보하기
A MBO(management buyout) is a form of takeover where a company's existing directors acquire a large part or all of the company. MBOs are similar in all major legal aspects to any other acquisition of a company. The particular nature of the MBO lies in the position of the buyers as directors of the company, and the practical consequences that follow from that. Legal Issues especially relating to MBOs arise when the asymmetric information possessed by directors may offer them unfair advantage relative to current shareholders. The impending possibility of MBOs may lead to principal–agent problems, moral hazard, and perhaps even the subtle downward manipulation of the stock price prior to sale via adverse information disclosure. Since corporate valuation is often subject to considerable uncertainty and ambiguity, and since it can be heavily influenced by asymmetric or inside information, some question the validity of MBOs and consider them to potentially represent a form of insider trading. This article focus on the legal issues which arise surrounding structural conflict of interest of MBOs between the shareholder who sell its stock and director who acquire those stock, and then discuss its solution, operation methods in South Korea. We then provide a theoretical criteria for the use of MBOs as the appropriate standard for M&A. This article is organized in six parts. Part Ⅱ address the concept and function of MBOs and its nature of structural conflict of interests (Ⅱ. The Concept of MBOs and Its Structure of Conflict of Interest). Part Ⅲ we briefly review major country’s MBO regulations and cases (Ⅲ. Major Country’s MBO Regulations and Cases), and in part Ⅳ we review duty of directors who acquire stock of the company, and a standard of judgement on occupational breach of trust (Ⅳ. Duty of Care of on Directors, and Standard of Judgement on Occupational Breach of Trust).

목차

등록된 정보가 없습니다.

참고문헌 (34)

참고문헌 신청

이 논문의 저자 정보

최근 본 자료

전체보기

댓글(0)

0