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논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2012.1
- 수록면
- 99 - 137 (39page)
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This paper studies the financial capital structure in Leveraged Buy Out (LBO) acquisitions. It analyzes how the arrival of new targets improves the agents' incentives when there is asymmetric information.
The entrepreneur and the LBO investor exert unobservable efforts to enhance the productivity of their project. We show that there are no debt-equity contracts that induce the entrepreneur and the LBO investor to provide the first-best levels of efforts. The decision of the LBO fund to exit prematurely the entrepreneur's project increases the agents' incentives. We also find that the entrepreneur's incentives increase with the amount of debt and when the LBO investor promises her the whole compensation cost.
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참고문헌 (29)
참고문헌 신청
Admati, A. / 1994 / Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists / Journal of Finance 49 : 371 ~ 402
Andres C / / Going private via LBO - Shareholders gains in the European markets
Axelson, U / / Why are buyouts levered: the nancial structure of private equity funds In working paper 12826
Bergemann, D / 1998 / Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning / Journal of Banking and Finance 22 : 371 ~ 402
Berglof, E. / 1994 / A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance / Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10 : 247 ~ 267
Andres C / / Going private via LBO - Shareholders gains in the European markets
Axelson, U / / Why are buyouts levered: the nancial structure of private equity funds In working paper 12826
Bergemann, D / 1998 / Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning / Journal of Banking and Finance 22 : 371 ~ 402
Berglof, E. / 1994 / A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance / Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10 : 247 ~ 267
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