지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
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초록· 키워드
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The regulation on the loyalty rebates became one of hot issues among several competition authorities. The Intel case was dealt by Japan, Korea, EU and the United States of America. However, the legal principles of loyalty rebates by market dominant enterprisers are not clear, yet.
There are two positions in regulating loyalty rebates by market dominant enterprisers. One is active position and the other is passive position. The active position emphasizes that loyalty rebates are essentially price discounts although they have exclusionary effects. The position argues that they can be regulated in case anti-competitive effects are proven. It is concerned about false positives. On the other hand, the passive position emphasizes that loyalty rebates are essentially exclusionary or even punitive. According to the position, illegality can be admitted by the harms to the competitors or the allocated price below marginal cost.
The passive position argues that cost-based test or hypothetical equally efficient competitor test can be used to prove anti-competitive effects. However, the active position argues that those tests are notoriously hard to administer. The 2008 AAI Report for Obama Administration suggests structured rule of reason, according to which loyalty rebates are prima facie exclusionary with proving some elements.
The differences between two position are originated from two aspects of loyalty rebates; pro-competitive effects and anti-competitive effects. I think that the illegality depends on economic analysis about effects of each individual conducts.
목차
등록된 정보가 없습니다.
참고문헌 (30)
참고문헌 신청
/ 2005 / DG Competition Discussion Paper of the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses
/ 2007 / Antitrust Modernization Commission / Report and Recommendations
/ 2008 / Competition and Monopoly : Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 Of theSherman Act / Department of Justice
ABA Section of Antitrust Law / 1997 / Antitrust Law Developments
Albert A. Foer / 2008 / The Next Antitrust Agenda, The American Antitrust Institute's Transition Reporton Competition Policy to the 44th President of the United States / Vendeplas Publi
/ 2007 / Antitrust Modernization Commission / Report and Recommendations
/ 2008 / Competition and Monopoly : Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 Of theSherman Act / Department of Justice
ABA Section of Antitrust Law / 1997 / Antitrust Law Developments
Albert A. Foer / 2008 / The Next Antitrust Agenda, The American Antitrust Institute's Transition Reporton Competition Policy to the 44th President of the United States / Vendeplas Publi
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