지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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This study carefully investigates whether the degree of independence of outside directors effectively reducesthe likelihood of managers to over-invest. We further examine how such effect differs between two contrastinggroups with distinguished governance structure: Chaebol peer group versus Non-Chaebol peer group. Weemployed a longitudinal 2,331 firm by year cases to explore the primary research questions, and we appliedBiddle et al’s mechanism (2009) which suggests the close association between the propensity of corporateover-investment and total investment.
The findings show that the higher degree of independence of outside directors is negatively related to thelikelihood of managers to over-invest, suggesting that independent outside directors contribute to a long-termcorporate value by controlling overinvestment prone to occur after their incumbent directorate term. However,we didn’t find that the independent outside directors contribute to reducing the level of total investment amongfirms which are most likely to under-invest. In addition, we found that independent outside directors contributeto hindering over-investment only in the non-Chaebol group but no evidence in the Chaebol group for theexpected relationship, implying that outside directors do not play any role in protecting minority shareholders’interest and increasing corporate long-term value in the latter group.
This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence for the argument that how outsider directorscontribute to corporate value should be considered as not outcomes but inputs. Our study addresses an additional issue that the higher degree of independence of outside directors is likely to actively contribute to monitoringmedium- and long-term performance longer than the performance which occurred during the average 3- to4-year incumbent directorate term.
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참고문헌 (39)
참고문헌 신청
Myers, S. / 1977 / Determinants of Corporate Borrowing / Journal of Financial Economics 5
Myers, S. / 1984 / Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms have Information that Investors Do not have / Journal of Financial Economics 13
Peasnell, K. V. / 2005 / Board Monitoring and Earnings Management : Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals? / Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 32
Richardson, S. / 2006 / Over-investment of Free Cash Flow / Review of Accounting Studies 11
Rosenstein, S. / 1990 / Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealthy / Journal of Financial Economics 26
Myers, S. / 1984 / Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms have Information that Investors Do not have / Journal of Financial Economics 13
Peasnell, K. V. / 2005 / Board Monitoring and Earnings Management : Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals? / Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 32
Richardson, S. / 2006 / Over-investment of Free Cash Flow / Review of Accounting Studies 11
Rosenstein, S. / 1990 / Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealthy / Journal of Financial Economics 26
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