지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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We analyze a situation in which a monopolist incumbent and a potential entrant compete for the patent of a new technology, the owner of which can monopolize the market. If the set-up cost for the new technology is so large that the incumbent would let the patent sleep, the incumbent’s preemptive incentive is greater while its stand-alone incentive is smaller than the entrant’s. We find that for a drastic innovation, the incumbent invests more in R&D than the entrant if the market is highly profitable under the current technology and the new technology incurs large set-up cost.
목차
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참고문헌 (8)
참고문헌 신청
Arrow, K. J. / 1962 / Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors / Princeton University
Fudenberg, D. / 1983 / Preemption, leapfrogging, and competition in patent races / European Economic Review 22 : 3 ~ 31
Gilbert, R. J. / 1982 / Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly / American Economic Review 72 : 514 ~ 526
Katz, M. L. / 1987 / R&D rivalry with licensing or imitation / American Economic Review 77 : 402 ~ 420
Lee, T. / 1980 / Market structure and innovation: A reformulation / Quarterly Journal of Economics 94 : 429 ~ 436
Fudenberg, D. / 1983 / Preemption, leapfrogging, and competition in patent races / European Economic Review 22 : 3 ~ 31
Gilbert, R. J. / 1982 / Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly / American Economic Review 72 : 514 ~ 526
Katz, M. L. / 1987 / R&D rivalry with licensing or imitation / American Economic Review 77 : 402 ~ 420
Lee, T. / 1980 / Market structure and innovation: A reformulation / Quarterly Journal of Economics 94 : 429 ~ 436
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