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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국외국어대학교 법학연구소 외법논집 외법논집 제35권 제2호
발행연도
2011.1
수록면
235 - 248 (14page)

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Public Choice Theory is directed toward the study of politics based on economic principles. While members of the National Assembly and Judges are supposed to work in the public interest as efficiently, effectively and fairly as possible, public choice theorists see them as self- interested utility-maximizers, motivated by such factors as: "salary, prerequisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage etc.". Public Choice Theory is actually more general than just politics in that Public Choice Theory can explain true aspect of legislation and decision of the judiciary very well. In this paper, this writer aims to create an atmosphere for members of the National Assembly and Judges to work in the public interest by analysing some laws of the National Assembly and decision of Korean Constitutional Court on compulsory system hiring a lawyer in filing a constitutional appeal on a Public Choice Theory basis. This essay is composed five chapters. The first chapter is introduction of this essay. The second chapter is outline of Public Choice Theory. The third chapter is Public Choice Theory surrounding the Relocation of New Administrative Capital. The fourth chapter is Public Choice Analysis surrounding the decision of Korean Constitutional Court on compulsory system hiring a lawyer in filing a constitutional appeal. The fifth chapter is conclusion of this essay.

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