.In case of our country, it’s difficult to find the precedence of giving clear judgment of the decision standard of paternity; nevertheless, looking into how the legal principle evaluates the volitional element like the intention of becoming a father, or a father’s consent when the precedent decides on paternity will be a reference in arranging the decision standard of paternity consequent on test-tube reproduction; in this context, consideration of this issue will be a meaningful research.
Accordingly, this paper looked into how a father’s volitional element equal to the existence or non-existence of the intention of setting up a father-child relationship works on deciding on paternity consequent on artificial insemination, and what is the limit to the function of a father’s volitional element through the representative precedents. In case of an artificial insemination donor(hereinafter, “AID”), especially in a father-son relationship, there follows the concern that a new baby might be in an unsafe position depending on a husband’s consent to artificial insemination; therefore, in case a couple, who consented to getting sperm donation first, has a baby using sperm donation, the enactment of the law providing that the relevant husband cannot deny paternity of the baby is the task that should be preceded for the baby’s welfare though it is not related genetically; nevertheless, this paper puts emphasis on the fact it’s possible to fully surmount this problem only if the legal system can fully think of the intention of establishing a father-child relationship, which is a volitional element of paternity, as an important judgment factor in father-child formation even if following the present family law principle.
Nevertheless, in case such an intention of father-child establishment appears in an inequitable form, or in case a man in a specific relationship takes a method of denying his intention of becoming paternity even while consenting to the birth of a baby consequent on donation of his own sperm, it becomes the form restricted in the volitional element, which is the very limit in a volitional element.
In case of our country, it’s difficult to find the precedence of giving clear judgment of the decision standard of paternity; nevertheless, looking into how the legal principle evaluates the volitional element like the intention of becoming a father, or a father’s consent when the precedent decides on paternity will be a reference in arranging the decision standard of paternity consequent on test-tube reproduction; in this context, consideration of this issue will be a meaningful research.
Accordingly, this paper looked into how a father’s volitional element equal to the existence or non-existence of the intention of setting up a father-child relationship works on deciding on paternity consequent on artificial insemination, and what is the limit to the function of a father’s volitional element through the representative precedents. In case of an artificial insemination donor(hereinafter, “AID”), especially in a father-son relationship, there follows the concern that a new baby might be in an unsafe position depending on a husband’s consent to artificial insemination; therefore, in case a couple, who consented to getting sperm donation first, has a baby using sperm donation, the enactment of the law providing that the relevant husband cannot deny paternity of the baby is the task that should be preceded for the baby’s welfare though it is not related genetically; nevertheless, this paper puts emphasis on the fact it’s possible to fully surmount this problem only if the legal system can fully think of the intention of establishing a father-child relationship, which is a volitional element of paternity, as an important judgment factor in father-child formation even if following the present family law principle.
Nevertheless, in case such an intention of father-child establishment appears in an inequitable form, or in case a man in a specific relationship takes a method of denying his intention of becoming paternity even while consenting to the birth of a baby consequent on donation of his own sperm, it becomes the form restricted in the volitional element, which is the very limit in a volitional element.