메뉴 건너뛰기
.. 내서재 .. 알림
소속 기관/학교 인증
인증하면 논문, 학술자료 등을  무료로 열람할 수 있어요.
한국대학교, 누리자동차, 시립도서관 등 나의 기관을 확인해보세요
(국내 대학 90% 이상 구독 중)
로그인 회원가입 고객센터 ENG
주제분류

추천
검색

논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
서울대학교 인지과학연구소 Journal of Cognitive Science Journal of Cognitive Science 제14권 제2호
발행연도
2013.1
수록면
111 - 149 (39page)

이용수

표지
📌
연구주제
📖
연구배경
🔬
연구방법
🏆
연구결과
AI에게 요청하기
추천
검색

초록· 키워드

오류제보하기
In a recent series of papers, John Collins has challenged the dominant epistemic view of Chomsky’s faculty of language (FL), which holds that the FL consists fundamentally of propositional knowledge. Collins presents the architectural view that holds that the FL is a computational information-processing system. I fully endorse this broad architectural perspective. Nonetheless, I would like to discuss one aspect of his architectural view which maintains that we should not understand the FL as a causal mechanism, that is, as part of a causal nexus. In this paper, I will try to develop the main lines of an alternative,though perhaps broadly compatible, way of unfolding the architectural perspective in which it makes sense to think of an aspect of the minimalist program as a cognitive functional model that nevertheless describes a causal mechanism. I will argue that there are no compelling reasons to discard the possibility of conceiving the FL as a causal mechanism (albeit an idealized one) of the same nature as the mechanisms which any scientific theory about cognitive architecture attempts to explain. The model in and of itself is not a mechanistic one in that it only specifies the functional properties of its object of description, leaving aside structural properties such as location, temporal order of processing, and the like. Still, the object being described, the FL, can be conceived of as a mechanism. Unlike the advocates of mechanistic explanations,I will argue that there are cognitive mechanisms that can have a genuine functional explanation (i.e. that do not constitute a ‘mechanism sketch’) depending on the correspondence that can be achieved between the cognitive model and the cognitive mechanism. If the correspondence between the entities, activities,and organization postulated by the cognitive model is direct or straightforward regarding the entities, activities, and organization of the mechanism, then there are good chances of obtaining a mechanistic explanation; one in which not only the functional, but also the structural, properties of the mechanism are specified. If, on the other hand, the correspondence is indirect, as in the case of the FL mechanism, the functional explanation appears to be the most adequate to the extent that it highlights the relevant explanatory characteristics of the mechanism.

목차

등록된 정보가 없습니다.

참고문헌 (35)

참고문헌 신청

이 논문의 저자 정보

최근 본 자료

전체보기

댓글(0)

0