본고는 근대 이후 서양철학에서 제기된 결정론 내지 자유의지의 문제가 불교철학 내에서도 논의될 여지가 있는지를 검토하면서, 서양철학의 관점에서 결정론-자유의지론의 논의가 인도불교 내의 문제제기나 그 해결책과 얼마만큼 연결될 수 있는지를 따져 보고자 했다. 필자의 주장의 요점은 결정론과 관련된 불교의 논의맥락이 서양철학의 그것과는 다르다는 점을 인식하는 것이 중요하다는 것이며, 서양철학의 용어에 따라 불교의 대응하는 이론을 결정론이나 자유의지론으로 규정하려는 시도는 불교의 현상론적 분석에서 그대로 수용되거나 인정될 수 없다는 것이다. 이를 위해 불교에서 심-신의 구분의 의의와 업의 의업으로서의 해석이 갖는 의미를 논의했다. 그리고 업의 재생과정에서의 생물학적 제약성을 집수 개념의 분석을 통해, 또 현재의 지각작용에서 업의 제약성과 동시에 심적 선택의 가능성을 제시했다. 이를 통해 ‘참여자의 반응태도’의 문제가 중요한 역할을 하게 된다.
It is suggested that there are no relevant discussions on the issue "Determinism and free will" in Buddhism. In some sense, it is true, but if we recognize the fact that the issue itself was a relatively recent phenomena even in the history of Western philosophy, one may argue that it has been only in the Western philosophy a topic reflecting her own tradition. However, if we look more closely into the Buddhist tradition, we cannot but escape from the impression that the arguments, which seem to presuppose the understanding of the topic at issue, are not rare, though, at the same time, we must admit that the topic was raised and discussed in the context of Buddhist terminology, therefore, reflected rather her own concern. The aim of the present paper is to show, that the issue "determinism and free will" should be considered rather in the context of Buddhist concepts, such as karma etc. For this purpose I choose the concept of karma and the related concepts found in Yogācāra-Buddhism.
It has been argued by some Buddhist scholars that Buddhism can be characterized with regard to the "determinism and free will" as "hard determinism"; some argue for "libertarianism" or "compatibilism". (see Charles Goodman 2002). It is not the purpose of the present paper to investigate whether or not the critical examination of his study is tenable.
I share the same opinion with M. Siderits, who thinks that Buddhist position represents a kind of compatibilism. In proving my argument, I think, it would be preferable to start with the proper reading of the Buddhist theory of Mind-Body relation, which eventually speaks for the duality of mind and body, though in conventional level.
With the expression "duality of mind and body", I mean the categorization of five skandhas into nāman ("name") and rūpa ("matter"). It goes without saying that the psychological factors, included in "name" in this category, have their own characteristics, and therefore their existence cannot be denied. All these skandhas are subordinated to the law of "Origination in Dependence (pratītyasamutpāda)", and to some extant, to the law of karma. One could argue that the law of karma correspond in Western terminology to the determinism, in the sense that the result must have arisen from the former cause.
But, I suspect, whether the Buddhist concept of karma has such an implication as the "determinism" may have. Denn: there would be no need among Indian philosophical schools to differentiate the meaning of karma, if it only means a kind of causal connectedness. Because with one exception of Cārvakas, all Indian schools have agreed in that point. I suggest that the introduction of the Mind-Body dualism can be a good indicator to show the way out of the dichotomy which the theories of Makkhali and Ajita have confronted at the time of Buddha.
The concept of karma in Buddhism is clearly defined as "intentional act (cetanā-karma)", and in this respect it differs greatly from other Indian traditions. When the karma is viewed as an intention, then this 'psychological' interpretation seems to offer the room for the compatabilist. For it will be more likely suitable for the intentional act, which has formed and will form the basis of not only material but also psychological elements, to exercise the influences on, or to be influenced by other psychological emotions, such as resentment and anger etc. which function in the same sphere, namely 'mind'. In other word: the decisive power of the karma is weakened. The spiritual training would be meaningful only we accept the changeability of other psychological factors.
I point out that the crucial theoretical resetting from the emphasis of 'intentional act' to the psychological factors has to do with the changeability of the function of mind. My ideas is that the Buddhist viewpoint could anchor on the compatibilism. For demonstrating it, I deal with two problems.
Firstly, the law of karma is still a decisive element in forming the mental and material basis of personal existence, hereby escaping from the danger that all happen to be chance. Depending on the traditional concept "appropriation (upādāna)", which plays an important role in the explanation of the third and fourth elements of the "Dependant origination", I explain how the consciousness (vijñāna), swayed by the power of previous karma, come to unite firmly with other physical and psychological factors. We can define it as "determinated" by the former cause, also, in terms of determinism. We should, however, remind of the fact that the karma functions only as forming the conditions.
Secondly, the determinists' view will be weakened, if we recognize the importance of the actual process of perceptions, on the basis of which wholesome or unwholesome thoughts constantly occur. In every thought-moments, we have the power of making decision freely, though the physical and mental settings are karmically preconditioned. To repeat the determinist definition is not hit the point, because of somewhat another implication of "determined" for the Buddhist, as said before. And, to answer to the deep psychological determinism, I give an famous example from the Yogācaāra school that the latent power (bīja) and actual state (pravṛtti) of consciousness depend on each other, and that their mutual interactions happen simultaneously. I am of the opinion that it raise a strong counter-argument for the psychological determinism.
