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학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국경영법률학회 경영법률 경영법률 제23권 제3호
발행연도
2013.1
수록면
71 - 103 (33page)

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A key organizational feature of large corporations is the separation of ownership from control. This separation creates so-called “agency problem”, that managers may run the firm on their own, rather than the shareholders' interest, choosing the quiet life over the maximization of share value. These days, the corporate governance has been the focus on external monitoring, especially institutional investor in securities market. Although the institutional investor would improve the corporate governance while they acted rationally and properly in governance decisions, many institutional investors in Korea have been acting passively even after economic crisis. Since this passivity of institutional investor also has been attributed to lack of institutional voting research system, Korea Corporate Governance Service provides the proxy advisory services to institutional investors, taking advantage of its extensive experience in corporate governance matters and proxy analysis. In Korea many institutional investors are now slowly moving to active role. Additionally, to activate their voting right practice, changing attitudes of institutional investors, reforming the legal system, and improving institutional voting research & analysis system are required.

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