지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
The North Korean Peoples Army(NKPA) accepted and translated the Soviet Military Doctrine before the Korean War(1950~1953), and so the Soviet Military Doctrine affected the North Korea way of the battle. Particularly the “Crossing Operations” doctrine is an important matter because of the configuration of the Korea ground-Han River, Geum River and Nakdong River. And so the North Korea recognize the fact that crossing operations were important but they didn’t have sufficient troops and equipment for this operations. But NKPA executed the crossing operation at early combat in Korean War by the military doctrine, NKPA’s FM “Crossing Operations”. Therefore this study show that how the military doctrine executed in the Nakdong Bulge Battle.
The river crossing operations classify into two groups, elaborate-crossing and prompt-crossing operations. The Nakdong Bulge Battle at the NKPA’s August Offensive was not elaborate-crossing, but prompt-crossing operations. The NK 4th Division could secure a bridgehead by surprise attack through the crossing Nakdong River in secret. But they didn’t extend the bridgehead. At first reason is that they delayed the heavy equipment (like as tank and artillery) crossing operations because that they did not have equipment for this operations. The Second is that decision of Walker and counterattack of the Marine Brigade.
The Nakdong Bulge Battle at NKPA’s September Offensive was elaborate-crossing operations. They did make a thorough preparation the crossing operations for success. For example, they prepared the underwater bridge, raft bridge, personal equipment and others. Particularly their patrol get information about the enemy’s movements. Through this preparation of crossing operations and patrol, the NK 2nd and 9th Divisions also could secure a bridgehead. They could clear obstacles like enemy’s tank and an artilleryman, separate US 2nd Division, and cross the heavy equipment. But NKPA didn’t extend the bridgehead. The first reason is that their concept of the crossing operations was only division grade operations, not corps grade operations. If September Offensive was corps grade operation, they had hold the succeed division and so could gain a decisive victory at the Nakdong bulge. But they didn’t. The secondary reason is that decision of Walker and counterattack of the Marine brigade.
The river crossing operations classify into two groups, elaborate-crossing and prompt-crossing operations. The Nakdong Bulge Battle at the NKPA’s August Offensive was not elaborate-crossing, but prompt-crossing operations. The NK 4th Division could secure a bridgehead by surprise attack through the crossing Nakdong River in secret. But they didn’t extend the bridgehead. At first reason is that they delayed the heavy equipment (like as tank and artillery) crossing operations because that they did not have equipment for this operations. The Second is that decision of Walker and counterattack of the Marine Brigade.
The Nakdong Bulge Battle at NKPA’s September Offensive was elaborate-crossing operations. They did make a thorough preparation the crossing operations for success. For example, they prepared the underwater bridge, raft bridge, personal equipment and others. Particularly their patrol get information about the enemy’s movements. Through this preparation of crossing operations and patrol, the NK 2nd and 9th Divisions also could secure a bridgehead. They could clear obstacles like enemy’s tank and an artilleryman, separate US 2nd Division, and cross the heavy equipment. But NKPA didn’t extend the bridgehead. The first reason is that their concept of the crossing operations was only division grade operations, not corps grade operations. If September Offensive was corps grade operation, they had hold the succeed division and so could gain a decisive victory at the Nakdong bulge. But they didn’t. The secondary reason is that decision of Walker and counterattack of the Marine brigade.
목차
1. 머리말
2. 북한군 도하작전 교리
3. 영산전투시 북한군 도하작전
4. 맺음말
ABSTRACT
참고문헌 (30)
참고문헌 신청
David J.Seigle / 2000 / Pusan: "Stand or Die" / 1stBooks Library :137~138
Edwin P.Hoyt / 1984 / The Pusan Perimeter / Stein and Pay :235
Roy E. Appleman / 2001 / 낙동강에서 압록강까지 / 육군본부
Uzal W.Ent / 1996 / Fighting On the Brink:Defense of the Pusan Perimeter / Turner Publishing Company :283
국방부 군사편찬연구소 / 2001 / 소련군사고문단장 라주바예프의 6⋅25전쟁 보고서 제1권 :198~204
Edwin P.Hoyt / 1984 / The Pusan Perimeter / Stein and Pay :235
Roy E. Appleman / 2001 / 낙동강에서 압록강까지 / 육군본부
Uzal W.Ent / 1996 / Fighting On the Brink:Defense of the Pusan Perimeter / Turner Publishing Company :283
국방부 군사편찬연구소 / 2001 / 소련군사고문단장 라주바예프의 6⋅25전쟁 보고서 제1권 :198~204
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