This essay analyzes J. L. Schellenberg`s analogy argument from divine hiddenness and mounts a critique of its reasonableness. Schellenberg`s contribution to the age-long discussions of divine hiddenness has been to relate the issue not to divine mystery or providence as most thinkers have attempted, but to the absence or nonexistence of God. Schellenberg argues that a “perfectly loving God” of traditional theism in reality does not exist. He maintains that a perfectly loving God, if he exists, would not create “inculpable nonbelief” by hiding his existence and love from seekers who are willing to believe if they are offered sufficient evidence. Schellenberg concludes that there still exist such seekers and thus a perfectly loving God does not exist. In his analogy argument, Schellenberg transfers a hypothetical nonexistent mother (base analog) who never shows up despite her little child`s cry for help to the perfectly loving God (target analog) who often seems hidden even from earnest seekers. It is my thesis that this transfer is not reasonable because it does not do justice to the infinite disanalogy between a human mother and God. Schellenberg`s analogy argument ultimately fails to become a probable explanation of God`s hiddenness as he univocally applies key predicates such as “care for” and “love” to God and humankind. Being a weak inductive argument that requires independent support for its conclu sion, no analogy argument can create knowledge of God, including the knowledge of God`s nonexistence. Analogy can be a part of the knowledge of God if and if only it is confirmed and supported by divine revelation.