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Leibniz's Criticism of Occasionalism as Spinozism
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Type
Academic journal
Author
Lee, Sukjae (서울대학교)
Journal
Institute of Philosophy, Seoul National University CHUL HAK SA SANG : Journal of Philosophical Ideas Vol.55 KCI Accredited Journals
Published
2015.2
Pages
139 - 178 (40page)

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Leibniz's Criticism of Occasionalism as Spinozism
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Abstract· Keywords

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Leibniz, in On Nature Itself, famously charges that occasionalism makes “God the very nature of things, while created things disappear into mere modifications of the one divine substance” (G IV 508-9/AG 165). Leibniz pivots this ‘Spinozism’ charge on the key claim that Malebranche and like-minded occasionalists fail to appreciate that substantiality itself is tightly connected to there being genuine causal forces internal to the entities in question. What is not clear is why Malebranche would be subject to such a criticism, if the central issue is how to understand what it is to be substance. While occasionalists do deny genuine causal activity on the part of creatures, they do not take this denial of causality to entail the absence of creaturely substances. This response raises questions about the overall persuasiveness of Leibniz’s argument, along with concerns about whether it is begging the question against Malebranche. In this paper, I hope to address these issues by taking a closer look at Leibniz’s Spinozism criticism. A key will be to understand how Leibniz argues for his conception of substance as activity. I will argue that Leibniz’s case for his conception of substance ultimately relies on his views about persistence. I will propose that Leibniz appears to think that if creatures are to be regarded as substances, they must persist, and, moreover, that the persistence of creatures must be accounted a particular manner?persistence has to be grounded in forces intrinsic to the creature. Based on this analysis, I will go on to pursue the question of how convincing this claim is. In the end, I will cautiously suggest that Leibniz can go a considerable way in motivating this claim, if we take Leibniz to be emphasizing a particular type of dependence that modes have on substances. On my reading, Leibniz is suggesting that the lack of intrinsic forces within the Malebranchean scheme opens occasionalism up to the charge that created individuals are not much more than bundles of modifications. That is, creatures on the Malebranchean scheme lack substantial unity, a consequence that indeed seems dangerously close to Spinozism.

Contents

【Abstract】
1. Malebranche’s Occasionalism
2. Force, Persistence, and Individuation
3. A Malebranchean Response
4. Malebranchean Laws and Bundles of Modes
5. Yet Another Malebranchean Response
6. The Charge of Spinozism
Bibliography
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2016-105-001306246