지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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Reliability theories of epistemic justification face three main objections: the generality problem, the demon-world (or brain-in-a-vat) counterexample, and the clairvoyant-powers counterexample. In Perception and Basic Beliefs(Oxford 2009), Jack Lyons defends reliabilism at length against the clairvoyant powers case. He argues that the problem arises due to a laxity about the category of basic beliefs, and the difference between inferential and non-inferential justification. Lyons argues reliabilists must pay more attention to architecture. I argue this isn’t necessarily so. What really matters for understanding and solving the case involves paying closer attention to the origins of our belief forming capacities, both inferential and non-inferential. Reliabilists should make origins matter more.
목차
Ⅰ. The Trouble with Simple Reliabilism
Ⅱ. Primal Systems and Basic Beliefs
Ⅲ. Basic Inference
Ⅳ. Architecture vs. Origins
Ⅴ. The Relativity of Origins
Ⅵ. Why Origins Might Matter
Ⅶ. Hopeful Monsters
Ⅷ. Origins Emasculated
References
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2016-160-001317588