지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술대회자료
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2012.11
- 수록면
- 411 - 434 (24page)
이용수
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
This article examines the effect of an eco-industry on environmental regulation under vertical structure. The framework on eco-industry can be formulated with the model of vertical structure, in which pollution abatement goods are delivered to polluting firms by an environmental monopoly, and downstream industry, producing consumption goods and emitting environmental pollutants, is limited by imperfect competition. We will take the viewpoint of policy coordination, and examine which policy combination is beneficial to the society to remedy different market failures, such as environmental policy for social damage, competition policy for imperfect competition, and patent policy on eco-technology. Therefore, if the government can use multiple instruments, such as taxation, subsidy, and patent licensing, the desirability can be obtained.
First, we derived the optimal combination of instruments of environmental tax and abatement subsidy and showed that the optimal environmental tax should be used for social damage and output restrictions in final production, and the optimal abatement subsidy should incorporate the tax effect of upstream market restrictions on abatement activity.
Second, when subsidy policy is restricted, we examined the second-best environmental taxation and emphasized the key elements affecting the trade-off between the distortion from market power of downstream firms and social damage. Then, the overall effect depends on the number of firms and marginal damage.
Finally, we consider the delegation policy of patent licensing, where an upstream monopolist can make a contract for licensing a pollution abatement technology with downstream polluters under emission tax. We compare the efficiency of royalty licensing and fixed-fee licensing, and show that contrary to royalty licensing contract, the monopolist can control the number of licensees under fixed-fee licensing contract and increase the production of abatement goods, which may decrease pollution level. However, the welfare effects under fixed-fee licensing on eco-technology depend on the abatement technology costs and pollution damage levels.
First, we derived the optimal combination of instruments of environmental tax and abatement subsidy and showed that the optimal environmental tax should be used for social damage and output restrictions in final production, and the optimal abatement subsidy should incorporate the tax effect of upstream market restrictions on abatement activity.
Second, when subsidy policy is restricted, we examined the second-best environmental taxation and emphasized the key elements affecting the trade-off between the distortion from market power of downstream firms and social damage. Then, the overall effect depends on the number of firms and marginal damage.
Finally, we consider the delegation policy of patent licensing, where an upstream monopolist can make a contract for licensing a pollution abatement technology with downstream polluters under emission tax. We compare the efficiency of royalty licensing and fixed-fee licensing, and show that contrary to royalty licensing contract, the monopolist can control the number of licensees under fixed-fee licensing contract and increase the production of abatement goods, which may decrease pollution level. However, the welfare effects under fixed-fee licensing on eco-technology depend on the abatement technology costs and pollution damage levels.
목차
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Vertical Model with Eco-Industry
3. First-Best Regulation with Tax and Subsidy
4. Second-Best Regulation with Tax only
5. Patent Licensing on Eco-Technology
6. Conclusion
References
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2016-323-001237979