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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술대회자료
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2014.8
- 수록면
- 2,544 - 2,571 (28page)
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초록· 키워드
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Controlling shareholders of most Korean companies transfer their corporate ownership to the next generation through stock gifts. In this paper, we examine whether controlling shareholders who plan for stock gifts would manage earnings in an attempt to influence stock prices prior to gifting stocks to related parties. Because gift taxes are levied on the basis of the average market value of the stock transferred for a certain period known as the valuation period, the controlling shareholders may be incentivized to depress stock prices during this period to alleviate the tax burden. We specifically hypothesize that controlling shareholders will engage in earnings management in the quarters that precede and/or overlap with the valuation period in an effort to adversely affect stock price. To test this hypothesis, we analyze a sample of 185 gift transactions in which controlling shareholders transferred stocks as gifts during the time of 2000-2009. We discover that the firms that gift in the sample significantly decrease their discretionary accruals in the quarters that precede and/or overlap with the valuation period, compared with those of other quarters. Further, the income-decreasing earnings management is found more evident during a bear market. By contrast, we do not observe a similar earnings management behavior in the cases where stocks are gifted to institutional donees that are not subject to gift taxes.
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