메뉴 건너뛰기
.. 내서재 .. 알림
소속 기관/학교 인증
인증하면 논문, 학술자료 등을  무료로 열람할 수 있어요.
한국대학교, 누리자동차, 시립도서관 등 나의 기관을 확인해보세요
(국내 대학 90% 이상 구독 중)
로그인 회원가입 고객센터 ENG
주제분류

추천
검색
질문

논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
Woohyung Lee (Keimyung University) Ki-Dong Lee (Keimyung University)
저널정보
한국경제연구학회 Korea and the World Economy Korea and the World Economy Vol.15 No.2
발행연도
2014.8
수록면
309 - 328 (20page)

이용수

표지
📌
연구주제
📖
연구배경
🔬
연구방법
🏆
연구결과
AI에게 요청하기
추천
검색
질문

초록· 키워드

오류제보하기
The purpose of this study is two-fold: First, we investigate how X-inefficiency affects the behaviors of firms in a mixed oligopoly market. Second, we explore whether optimal subsidies can restore the social optimum like the previous literature on subsidization, with assuming that the efficiency of a public firm depends on the degree of privatization. The main results are as follows. First, despite higher marginal cost due to X-inefficiency, the price of a public firm tends to be lower than that of a private firm, when the degree of nationalization of the public firm is low enough. Second, if the marginal effect of nationalization on X-inefficiency measured at full privatization is relatively low and the elasticity of X-inefficiency measured at full nationalization is greater than the critical level, then the partial privatization is the optimal strategy from the social welfare viewpoint. Third, when an efficiency gap exists between firms, asymmetric subsidization can restore the social optimum, and the optimal subsidization level is not directly related to the degree of nationalization, but is affected by the efficiency gap. In addition, the subsidy for a private firm is larger than that for a public firm, which is relatively inefficient compared to the private firm.

목차

1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE MODEL
3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
4. SUBSIDIZATION AND SOCIAL OPTIMUM
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
REFERENCES

참고문헌 (22)

참고문헌 신청

이 논문의 저자 정보

이 논문과 함께 이용한 논문

최근 본 자료

전체보기

댓글(0)

0

UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2015-300-002825803