지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2014.6
- 수록면
- 171 - 180 (10page)
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초록· 키워드
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The success of distributed systems such as grids and P2P networks lies in cooperation for local resource sharing. The lack of any centralized coordinator and the selfish behaviors of individual machines, however, raise a problem for such cooperation, leaving the prescribed protocol vulnerable to strategic manipulation. The most significant recent advances in distributed systems have therefore been to apply game theory and other branches in economics to model incentives for cooperation, as the first step towards robust protocol design. In this paper, we aim to provide an analytical framework to investigate the evolution of cooperation in distributed systems.
목차
Abstract
Introduction
Related Work
Demystify the Game Structure of BitTorrent
Pitfalls and Merits of Auction Model
The Learning and Evolution Paradigm
The Evolution of Cooperation
Conclusions
References
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2015-500-002466913