지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
This study examines the causality between regime types and market economies. The foundation of sound market economies is a limited government. The government capacity should be strong enough to punish opportunists in the market, yet limited to be deterred from violating property rights of civil society in order to preserve the market. Democracy is supposed to contribute to building a limited government on the condition that the citizens reach the agreement with what consists of the government violation of limits on its own behavior and share the will to resist the opportunistic state officials. Then a limited government is a self-enforcing equilibrium. Unfortunately, this social consensus is missing in most of the developing countries. Democratization, combined with the degree of rentier economy, state institutional conditions, and the size of state-owned economy, has produced diverse institutional outcomes, which are often opposite to a limited government and devastated the market. On the other hand, the political logic of dictatorship might lead to relatively reliable property rights based upon credible threats of social groups and elites on the dictator. In order to facilitate the formation of a limited government, the international society should commit itself to not only economic but also military support whose cost is unlikely to be high instead of imposing formal constitutional order void of aboriginal contexts.
목차
ABSTRACT
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 민주주의 없이 시장제도는 없다?
Ⅲ. 민주화는 시장경제를 위협하는가? : 아프리카와 구소련 대 동유럽
Ⅳ. 독재는 얼마나 나쁜가?
Ⅴ. 결론
참고문헌
참고문헌 (38)
참고문헌 신청
1. [단행본] - Acemoglu, Daron / 2005 / Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy / Cambridge University Press
2. [단행본] - Alesina, Alberto / 1994 / Political Models of Macroeconomic Policy and Fiscal Reforms, in Voting for Reform / Oxford University Press
3. [단행본] - Axelord, Robert / 1984 / The Evolution of Cooperation / Basic Books
4. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Bates, Robert H. / 2002 / Organizing Violence / Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (5)
5. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Bates, Robert H. / 2004 / On the Politics of Property Rights by Haber, Razo, and Mauer / Journal of Economic Literature 42
2. [단행본] - Alesina, Alberto / 1994 / Political Models of Macroeconomic Policy and Fiscal Reforms, in Voting for Reform / Oxford University Press
3. [단행본] - Axelord, Robert / 1984 / The Evolution of Cooperation / Basic Books
4. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Bates, Robert H. / 2002 / Organizing Violence / Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (5)
5. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Bates, Robert H. / 2004 / On the Politics of Property Rights by Haber, Razo, and Mauer / Journal of Economic Literature 42
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2015-340-001271536