This paper attempts to analyze the Russia’s policy toward the North Caucasus, especially focusing on the situation in the Republic of Ingushetia. Vladimir Putin sought to retain its control over the North Caucasus by eliminating radical Islamists, and vesting governmental authority within the hands of a select group of local pro-Kremlin leaders. In doing so, Moscow believes that it can pacify the North
Caucasus by coercing its opponents into submission. Newly elected Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has tried to distance himself from his predecessor"s methods and initiate a change in strategy. In 2010, he divided the Southern Federal District to create a new North Caucasus Federal District comprising six of the seven North Caucasus republics. Simultaneously, he advocated a new approach to the
problems of the North Caucasus, arguing that the region"s problems derive in the first instance from economic backwardness, unemployment, and high-level corruption. However, the objectives of Strategy-2025 are clearly unachievable. It focuses on
economic growth without addressing the socio-political preconditions that make the North Caucasus instable and explosive. The abuse of power and illegal methods of carrying out anti-terrorist operations give rise to a lack of trust in the authorities, and even a situation where people support anti-Russian insurgents.
In Ingushetia, the Kremlin"s ouster in 2001 of locally based and popular Ruslan Aushev and the blatantly Kremlin-manipulated election of Murat Zyazikov, former general in the Federal Security Services, as president of Ingushetia undoubtedly contributed to the sharply deteriorating security situation in that republic. A constant insurgency gained force as the weak and hated Zyazikov relied on force to rule. Finally, in late 2008, Moscow replaced Zyazikov with a moderate Yanus bek-Yevkurov. Yevkurov has sought to rein in government corruption, curtail human rights violations, and reach-out to insurgents by offering them amnesty in return for laying down their arms. In June of 2009, however, Yevkurov himself was severely wounded in an assassination attempt, and the intensity of the violence apparently has made clear to the Kremlin that its North Caucasus policy has not been successful. At this point of time, the fate of Putin"s renewed policy toward the North Caucasus remains unknown. This paper posits that if Moscow continues to adhere to the same course of action which it has in fact abided by for the past decade, then the Kremlin may well be dealt another devastating threats.