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This Paper is analyzing the dynamics of Rho Tae Woo Government"s Nordpolitik(Northen Policy)and the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement. Though
6·23 Declaration in 1973 was called the origins of South Korea"s Northen Policy, 7·7 Declaration(the Special Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity) was the first systemic efforts to pursue the virtuous circle between the normalization with Northeast Asian Communist powers(Russia, China) and the engagement policy toward North Korea. The Nordpolitik was a new foreign policy modifying traditional containment policy.
North Korea adopted the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement on the defensive stance resulting from sense of isolation from her former allies. But the success of the Nordpolitik was accomplished by the positive engagement in the post-cold war order change and the relative negligence of US."s foreign policy toward korean peninsula.
But Rho Tae Woo"s Government could not maintain the momentum because of North Korea"s nuclear crises, lame-duck and leadership crisis, and the breakdown of decision-making system. Especially the manipulation of the presidential instructions" (1992. 10) was the symbolic affairs reflected by the internal policy confusion.
6·23 Declaration in 1973 was called the origins of South Korea"s Northen Policy, 7·7 Declaration(the Special Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity) was the first systemic efforts to pursue the virtuous circle between the normalization with Northeast Asian Communist powers(Russia, China) and the engagement policy toward North Korea. The Nordpolitik was a new foreign policy modifying traditional containment policy.
North Korea adopted the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement on the defensive stance resulting from sense of isolation from her former allies. But the success of the Nordpolitik was accomplished by the positive engagement in the post-cold war order change and the relative negligence of US."s foreign policy toward korean peninsula.
But Rho Tae Woo"s Government could not maintain the momentum because of North Korea"s nuclear crises, lame-duck and leadership crisis, and the breakdown of decision-making system. Especially the manipulation of the presidential instructions" (1992. 10) was the symbolic affairs reflected by the internal policy confusion.
목차
들어가는 말
1. 북방정책과 대북정책의 관계: 실패와 성공의 이유
2. 북방정책: 한국 외교의 자율성
3. 남북기본합의서는 왜 이행되지 못했을까?
결론: 북방정책의 교훈
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2013-905-001129430