지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
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초록· 키워드
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Throughout its history, North Korea"s leadership had been trying to preserve its autonomy at any cost. The Juche ideology and the Suryung system promoted autonomy domestically and internationally.
In the aftermath of the Cold War era, Kim Il Sung was confronted with two options: to avoid regional isolation by pursuing the cross-recognition of both Koreas by all the major powers or to create a new balance of power through nuclear armament.
In response to the South Korean government"s Nord Politik policy in 1988, Kim Ii Sung during the early 1990s adopted the former of the two options, a "Sud Politik." Confronted with the sudden and unexpected recognition of South Korea by the Soviet Union in 1990, North Korea made efforts to normalize relations with Japan and the U.S. while enhancing Inter-Korean relations (through the North-South Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation). However, the Slid Politik failed as a conservative US, Japan, South Korea coalition shifted its North Korea policy from engagement to coercion in the aftermath of the recognition of South Korea by China in August 1992.
In response to this new coercive environment North Korea shifted its Sud Politik to its second option: nuclear armament. In order to accomplish this process the North Korean leadership fully utilized their diplomatic and domestic autonomy. No forces domestic or international would be allowed to block the nuclear armament process. The domestic and international autonomy that were established with the Juche ideology and Suryung system were further re-enforced with a new government-military coalition. The result was a 20 year-long nuclear crisis in which North Korea fell into the trap of autonomy; it successfully preserved its autonomy but at the cost of a collapsed political and economic system.
In the aftermath of the Cold War era, Kim Il Sung was confronted with two options: to avoid regional isolation by pursuing the cross-recognition of both Koreas by all the major powers or to create a new balance of power through nuclear armament.
In response to the South Korean government"s Nord Politik policy in 1988, Kim Ii Sung during the early 1990s adopted the former of the two options, a "Sud Politik." Confronted with the sudden and unexpected recognition of South Korea by the Soviet Union in 1990, North Korea made efforts to normalize relations with Japan and the U.S. while enhancing Inter-Korean relations (through the North-South Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation). However, the Slid Politik failed as a conservative US, Japan, South Korea coalition shifted its North Korea policy from engagement to coercion in the aftermath of the recognition of South Korea by China in August 1992.
In response to this new coercive environment North Korea shifted its Sud Politik to its second option: nuclear armament. In order to accomplish this process the North Korean leadership fully utilized their diplomatic and domestic autonomy. No forces domestic or international would be allowed to block the nuclear armament process. The domestic and international autonomy that were established with the Juche ideology and Suryung system were further re-enforced with a new government-military coalition. The result was a 20 year-long nuclear crisis in which North Korea fell into the trap of autonomy; it successfully preserved its autonomy but at the cost of a collapsed political and economic system.
목차
들어가며: 탈냉전과 북한의 대외정책 결정 요인
1. 80년대 북한의 개혁·개방 인식과 사회주의 ‘완전승리‘ 테제
2. 기본합의서 정국: 자율성 과잉의 대외·대남정책과 남방정책의 좌절
결론: 자율성 함정
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2013-905-001129425