지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
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초록· 키워드
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Telecommunications policymakers and commentators have long debated whether regulators should mandate access to existing facilities or instead promote incentives to invest in new network capacity by denying such access. After reviewing the history of mandating access to local telephone networks and last-mile broadband networks in the United States, this article reviews how mandating access to existing facilities necessarily embroils regulators with the troublesome problems associated with rate regulation, prevents firms from realizing the efficiencies associated with vertical integration, and impedes the emergence of competition by dampening both incumbents’ and new entrants’incentives to make new investments in alternative network capacity. Empirical scholarship studying this issue also largely supports focusing on stimulating facilities-based competition instead of relying on access regulation to mandate sharing of the monopoly loop.
목차
〈ABSTRACT〉
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. U.S. Regulatory History
Ⅲ. The Inevitability of Rate Regulation
Ⅳ. The Lost Benefits of Vertical Integration
Ⅴ. The Impact on Investment Incentives
Ⅵ. Conclusion
〈References〉
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2013-360-000256899