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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국생명윤리학회 생명윤리 생명윤리 제3권 제2호
발행연도
2002.12
수록면
16 - 32 (17page)

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The actual scientific and technological progress in the life science field offers many possibilities of intervention in the initial phases on human life. But are the techniques of intervention in pre-natal human life also ethically permissible and juridically permissible? Have the human zygotes, embryos and fetuses the person status?
In the debate on the person status of the human embryo, there are two main tradition: the personalism and the non-personalism. According to the non-personalism, the embryo is considered as a 'human being', but is not recognized as a 'person'. The human embryo is not yet a person; it becomes a person in some subsequent moment after conception. In this context, the description of the biological status of the human embryo becomes irrelevant to the definition of a person.
The non-personalism challenges some critical questions. How does one become a person without already being a person? What justifies the qualitative leap from the biological status to the person status of the human life? Why does a human life which has lived for a shorter time have less value? How can we safeguard human life 'after' the manifestation of certain capacities and functions if it is not safeguarded 'before'?
We can witness at the same time a 'restriction' and an 'expansion' of the concept of person, as a result of the separation of the 'human being'; not all human beings are persons (for instance, embryos); certain non-human beings are persons (for instance, animal with sensitivity). This carries the paradoxical consequence that certain superior mammals would seem to be more worthy of respect than the human embryo.
A possible way to overcome this paradox may be found in the return to the human. This means returning to the common understanding (which has always identified the human being and the person, the personalism), and to what is affirmed in the statement on human rights. The embryo is biologically human, and is entitled to rights. The embryo being de facto human is also a person. Being a person is a radical ontological condition. The human being does not 'become' a person, gradually acquiring certain capacities; the human being 'is' a person.
We must extend universally recognized human right to the initial confines of life. Today we are faced with new forms of discrimination in the differing importances attributed to the various stages and modes of manifestation of human life. But even the embryo, although quantitatively small, infinitesimal and imperceptible, is qualitatively human, and thus worthy of respect and protection.

목차

1. 서론
2. 비인격주의에서 본 인간 배아의 인격 지위
3. 비인격주의에 기초한 생명 윤리의 문제점
4. 생명 윤리의 기초로서의 인격주의
5. 인격주의에서 본 인간 배아의 인격 지위
6. 결론
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