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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
Sung-Hoon Park (Gyeonggi Research Institute) GiSeung Kim (Cheongju University)
저널정보
한국경제연구학회 Korea and the World Economy The Journal of the Korean Economy Vol.10 No.2
발행연도
2009.8
수록면
245 - 257 (13page)

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초록· 키워드

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This paper reports on a study that explores how asymmetric reimbursement rules affect effort expended in an environmental conflict. Both lawyers for a citizen group and a polluting firm work on an hourly-fee basis. The citizen group pays a monitoring cost to observe its lawyer?s effort level; whereas, the firm has either in-house legal advice or lawyers on retainer. We examine: (ⅰ) how monitoring cost decreases the citizen group lawyer?s effort level to enable the firm to be the favourite although the firm?s fault exists; (ⅱ) how the reimbursement rule can tilt the contest odds toward the citizen group; and (ⅲ) how the reimbursement rule can increase expected payoff for the citizen group and promote citizen suits. Three findings are as follows: First, the lawyer of the citizen group reduces effort as the monitoring cost of the citizen group increase so that the firm can be the contest favourite with the firm?s fault. Second, the reimbursement rule causes the citizen group to increase its lawyer?s effort level so that it leads the group to be the contest favourite relative to no reimbursement. Third, the reimbursement rule can increase the expected payoff of the citizen group that promotes the citizen suit.

목차

1. INTRODUCTION
2. A MODEL
3. A DELEGATION WITHOUT REIMBURSEMENT
4. A DELEGATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC FULL REIMBURSEMENT
5. CONCLUSION
REFERNECES

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