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논문 기본 정보
- 자료유형
- 학술저널
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2005.3
- 수록면
- 95 - 134 (40page)
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Although significant attention continues to be attached to the so-called second North Korean nuclear crisis following Pyongyang's announcement in February 2005 that it possessed nuclear weapons, North Korea's ballistic missiles also pose significant challenges to global nonproliferation efforts, not to mention the strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula. Since the 1970s, North Korea has accelerated work on various types of ballistic missiles inlcuding the Rodong as well as the long-range Taepodong-1. Recent press reports have also indicated that North Korea may also be working on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. If North Korea has SLBM capabilities, it would mean a significant step forward in its asymmetrical warfare capabilities and pose new threats to ROK as well as U.S. defense efforts.
This article traces the background of North Korea's ballistic missile program from three contexts: (1) evolutions in North Korea's core military strategies since the 1970s; (2) as a critical component of its WMD program including North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs; and (3) South Korea's shifting security consensus with a particular emphasis on the changing dimensions and contours of Seoul's perception of the North Korean military threat.
Experts and specialists continue to debate the nature, origin, magnitude and consequences of North Korea's nuclear weapons program but there is a greater consensus on North Korea's ballistic capabilities. In particular, North Korea's close collaboration with Pakistan through the now defunct A. Q. Khan network from the 1990s may have spurred North Korea's nuclear weapons program in exchange for steadfast delivery of ballistic missiles to Pakistan. The article argues, however, that perhaps the biggest change has occurred in terms of South Korea's own threat perceptions vis-a-vis the North since the historic June 2000 inter-Korean summit. Notwithstanding the opportunities in South-North CBMs, the article argues that a fundamental shift in South Korea' s threat perceptions has resulted in unrealistic assessments of North Korea's overall WMD threat spectrum including ballistic missiles.
If the ROK doesn't take corrective measures, it may soon be faced with multiple military threats from the North that could significantly impact its own deterrent posture although prospects for a more realistic assessment continues to be constrained by domestic politics and widely divergent public as well as elite opinions on the nature of the North Korean threat.
This article traces the background of North Korea's ballistic missile program from three contexts: (1) evolutions in North Korea's core military strategies since the 1970s; (2) as a critical component of its WMD program including North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs; and (3) South Korea's shifting security consensus with a particular emphasis on the changing dimensions and contours of Seoul's perception of the North Korean military threat.
Experts and specialists continue to debate the nature, origin, magnitude and consequences of North Korea's nuclear weapons program but there is a greater consensus on North Korea's ballistic capabilities. In particular, North Korea's close collaboration with Pakistan through the now defunct A. Q. Khan network from the 1990s may have spurred North Korea's nuclear weapons program in exchange for steadfast delivery of ballistic missiles to Pakistan. The article argues, however, that perhaps the biggest change has occurred in terms of South Korea's own threat perceptions vis-a-vis the North since the historic June 2000 inter-Korean summit. Notwithstanding the opportunities in South-North CBMs, the article argues that a fundamental shift in South Korea' s threat perceptions has resulted in unrealistic assessments of North Korea's overall WMD threat spectrum including ballistic missiles.
If the ROK doesn't take corrective measures, it may soon be faced with multiple military threats from the North that could significantly impact its own deterrent posture although prospects for a more realistic assessment continues to be constrained by domestic politics and widely divergent public as well as elite opinions on the nature of the North Korean threat.
목차
Ⅰ. 한반도 안보 현황과 북한 국가안보전략의 재인식
Ⅱ. 북한 탄도미사일의 전략적 기조
Ⅲ. 항공력 고양과 동아시아 안보
Ⅳ. 북한의 미사일 개발전략
Ⅴ. 결론
【참고문헌】
[ABSTRACT]
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-350-018345435